People v. Chavez CA2/7
B308641
Cal. Ct. App.Nov 10, 2021Background
- In 2008 Chavez was convicted as an aider and abettor of first degree murder; original sentence aggregated to 75 years-to-life with multiple fines, fees, and a $7,499.09 victim restitution award.
- In 2020 the trial court granted Chavez’s Penal Code §1170.95 petition, vacated the murder conviction, and resentenced him to a doubled upper term of three years (six years as a second‑strike), awarded 4,793 days’ custody credit (time served), and placed him on parole.
- The resentencing left approximately 2,603 days of excess custody credit (at $30/day), and the court reimposed prior fines/assessments (restitution fine $10,000; suspended parole‑revocation restitution fine $10,000; $20 DNA assessment; $20 court security fee) and had a prior victim restitution order arising from the murder conviction.
- Chavez appealed, arguing: (1) excess custody credits should offset fines/assessments; (2) the victim restitution award cannot stand as based on the vacated murder conviction (or, alternatively, the court must determine whether the assault supports restitution); and (3) the parole term was improperly set at up to three years.
- The People conceded error as to the custody credit offsets (except for the court security fee) and as to the three‑year parole term; the Court of Appeal agreed and remanded for a restitution hearing to determine causation for victim restitution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether excess custody credits must offset restitution fine, suspended parole‑revocation restitution fine, and DNA assessment, and whether they may offset the court security fee | People conceded excess credits should offset restitution, suspended parole fine, and DNA assessment; court security fee is nonpunitive and not offsetable | Chavez argued excess custody credits should be applied to reduce or satisfy his fines/assessments | Credits exceed fines; restitution fine, suspended parole‑revocation fine, and DNA assessment are satisfied in full by excess credits; court security fee is nonpunitive and cannot be offset |
| Whether prior victim restitution (based on vacated murder conviction) must be vacated or supported by new showing tied to assault conviction | People argued Chavez forfeited some challenges but maintained restitution may be supported if assault was a substantial factor in the homicide; on remand People bears burden to prove causation | Chavez argued restitution must be vacated because the murder conviction was vacated and restitution limited to losses caused by the crime of conviction | Remand for restitution hearing; People must prove by a preponderance that Chavez’s assault was a substantial factor in causing DeAvila’s death; if not proven, prior restitution must be vacated |
| Whether a three‑year parole term could be imposed after resentencing under §1170.95 | People conceded three years unauthorized and that §3000.01 caps parole at two years for determinate sentences released after July 1, 2020 | Chavez argued the court imposed three years under §1170.95(g) but §3000.01 applies and limits parole to two years | Sentence modified to reflect maximum two‑year parole term under §3000.01 |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Lamoureux, 57 Cal.App.5th 136 (excess custody credits must be applied to restitution fines under §2900.5)
- People v. Souza, 54 Cal.4th 90 (restitution fines governed by law in effect at time of sentence; ex post facto considerations)
- People v. Batman, 159 Cal.App.4th 587 (DNA penalty assessment characterized as a penalty)
- People v. Alford, 42 Cal.4th 749 (court security fee is nonpunitive and not a fine)
- People v. Trout‑Lacy, 43 Cal.App.5th 369 (tort causation principles—"but for" and substantial factor—apply to restitution causation)
- People v. Tan, 68 Cal.App.5th 1 (§3000.01 limits parole for determinate terms to two years; three‑year parole under §1170.95 is unauthorized)