People v. Chairez, 104 N.E.3d 1158

Background

In 2013 Julio Chairez pled guilty to unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) under 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4), (c)(1.5) for possessing a firearm within 1,000 feet of Virgil Gilman Trail (a public park) in Aurora, Illinois, as part of a plea agreement.
In 2015 Chairez filed a postconviction petition arguing the 1,000-foot restriction around specified locations violated the Second Amendment; the circuit court declared section 24-1(a)(4), (c)(1.5) unconstitutional and vacated his conviction.
The State appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 603; the Supreme Court limited review to the offense actually charged—possession within 1,000 feet of a public park—and vacated any broader advisory ruling.
The Illinois Supreme Court applied the two-step Second Amendment framework: (1) historical/textual inquiry whether conduct is protected; (2) if protected, apply means-ends scrutiny with a sliding-scale heightened scrutiny (following Seventh Circuit precedents).
The Court found the statute burdens core Second Amendment protection (bearing ready-to-use arms in public for self-defense), imposed a severe, categorical limitation on law-abiding citizens, and required an elevated form of intermediate scrutiny.
The State failed to show record evidence establishing a strong public-safety justification or a close fit between protecting parks and the 1,000-foot exclusion; the Court held the provision (possession within 1,000 feet of a public park) facially unconstitutional but severable from the remainder of section 24-1(c)(1.5).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Chairez)	Held
Whether 720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4), (c)(1.5) (possession within 1,000 ft of a public park) violates the Second Amendment	The restriction targets a "sensitive place" and is substantially related to protecting children/public safety; intermediate scrutiny should sustain it	The 1,000-foot zone is effectively a near-comprehensive public carry ban that burdens the core right to armed self-defense outside the home	The Court held the park-based 1,000-foot prohibition facially unconstitutional—it burdens the core right and fails heightened means-ends scrutiny
Whether the circuit court’s order improperly declared other location-based offenses unconstitutional	N/A (State argued the ruling should be limited)	Chairez argued statute as a whole is overbroad	The Court vacated any circuit-court finding beyond the park offense as advisory; limited decision to the charged offense
Whether the 1,000-foot location element is a sentencing enhancement (like Burns) or a distinct element of an aggravated offense	The State treated the location as an element creating a separate Class 3 offense	Chairez argued the enhancement functionally penalizes possession and was unconstitutional under Burns	The Court held the 1,000-foot location is an element of a distinct aggravated offense (not a post-conviction sentencing factor), distinguishing Burns
Whether the unconstitutional park provision is severable from the remainder of the statute	State argued severability should be considered to preserve the statute	Chairez implicitly opposed preservation of the park provision	The Court found the offending provision severable; remaining location-based provisions stand independent of the park provision

Key Cases Cited

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (recognized individual right to possess/use firearms for self-defense; identified certain presumptively lawful restrictions)
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporated Second Amendment against the states)
People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116 (Ill. 2013) (Illinois Supreme Court: statutory ban on carrying ready-to-use firearms outside the home facially unconstitutional)
People v. Mosley, 2015 IL 115872 (Ill. 2015) (extended Aguilar to public-way restriction; analytical limits on court rulings and severability principles)
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012) (Seventh Circuit struck down Illinois blanket public-carry prohibition; recognized right to public self-defense)
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011) (Ezell I) (set heightened means-ends scrutiny for laws burdening core Second Amendment rights)
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2017) (Ezell II) (applied close-fit requirement and evidentiary showing for zoning/regulatory limits affecting firearm training)
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (upheld categorical prohibition on firearm possession by certain misdemeanants under an intermediate-level showing)
United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (upheld felon-in-possession ban under intermediate scrutiny)
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) (facts that increase mandatory minimums must be submitted to jury; relevant to element vs. sentencing-factor analysis)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (any fact increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum must be proved to a jury)