People v. Cardman, 2016 COA 135

Background

Defendant Ryan Cardman was arrested after a search related to suspected internet activity; he invoked his Miranda rights and requested counsel during an initial custodial interview. Two days later, after contact between a DHS caseworker and Cardman’s wife, a detective interviewed Cardman again at the jail and obtained inculpatory admissions. Audio of the second interview was played at trial.
At a pretrial suppression hearing the detective testified he learned from the DHS caseworker and from Cardman’s wife that Cardman “had questions” about the investigation; the detective then called Cardman, who agreed to talk. The trial court found the evidence supported that Cardman directed his wife to tell police he wanted to speak.
Defense moved to suppress the post-invocation statements on the ground Cardman had not reinitiated contact; the court denied suppression. Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault on a child and appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that a suspect may reinitiate Miranda/Edwards protections through a third party, but only when police reasonably believe the suspect authorized the third-party contact and police confirm the suspect’s willingness to talk.
The court applied a reasonableness test (adopting and refining Van Hook) and concluded the detective reasonably believed Cardman had directed his wife to reinitiate and that the detective confirmed Cardman’s desire to speak, so admission of the statements did not violate Edwards. The court also held defendant waived a voluntariness hearing by not raising voluntariness at the suppression hearing, and rejected plain-error relief on contested credibility statements by the detective.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a suspect who invoked his right to counsel can reinitiate interrogation through a third party	Reinitiation can occur through an agent (here, wife); police lawfully recontacted after learning agent communicated suspect’s desire to talk	Only the suspect (or counsel) may directly reinitiate; indirect reinitiation via third party is not sufficient	A suspect may reinitiate through a third party, but prosecution must show police reasonably believed the third party was authorized by the suspect and that police confirmed the suspect’s willingness to talk; facts here satisfied that test
Whether trial court erred by refusing to sua sponte hold a voluntariness hearing and whether voluntariness review is available on appeal	Police interrogation tactics did not render statements involuntary; defense waived voluntariness by not raising it at suppression hearing	Interrogation contained coercive promises and tactics; court should review voluntariness for plain error or remand for a hearing	Defendant waived the voluntariness claim by not raising it at the suppression hearing; the court declined plain-error review and did not reach voluntariness on the merits
Admissibility of detective’s credibility comments during interview and testimony	Detective’s statements about believing the victim and not believing defendant were admissible as interrogation context and investigative technique	Such credibility assertions were improper and prejudicial	Most statements were admissible under Davis as interrogation technique/context; two borderline trial-testimony remarks were not plain error because they were not obvious and substantial errors

Key Cases Cited

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (establishes that, after invocation of right to counsel, police may not reinitiate interrogation unless the suspect initiates further communication)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda warning and custody/interrogation framework)
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (test for when a suspect’s comments evince willingness to discuss investigation — generalized discussion standard)
Van Hook v. Anderson, 488 F.3d 411 (6th Cir. en banc) (leading authority allowing third-party reinitiation where police reasonably believe suspect authorized third-party contact and confirm it)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (clarifies invocation clarity standard; referenced for objective reasonable-officer test)
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (awareness of investigation need not be precise for voluntary waiver of Miranda rights)
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (no constitutional requirement for sua sponte voluntariness hearing absent contemporaneous challenge)
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (right to a voluntariness hearing when issue is contemporaneously raised)
Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98 (on coercive pressures and assessing voluntariness after invocation of counsel)