People v. Buffer
2019 IL 122327
Ill.2020Background
- In 2010 Dimitri Buffer (age 16 at offense) was convicted of first-degree murder and found to have personally discharged the fatal firearm; he received an aggregate 50-year sentence (25 years for murder + 25-year firearm add-on).
- At sentencing the court stated it considered various factors but the record does not show it considered Buffer’s youth and attendant characteristics as required by Miller.
- Buffer filed a pro se postconviction petition (after Miller and Davis) arguing his 50-year term was a de facto life sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment; the circuit court summarily dismissed the petition.
- The appellate court reversed, holding the 50-year term was a mandatory de facto life sentence and the sentencing court failed to consider youth, vacating the sentence and remanding for resentencing under the juvenile-sentencing statute (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105).
- The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment, held a term over 40 years for a juvenile may be a de facto life sentence, found Buffer’s 50-year sentence unconstitutional because the court did not consider his youth, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing under section 5-4.5-105.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Buffer) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Buffer’s 50-year term is an unconstitutional de facto life sentence under Miller/Montgomery/Reyes | 50 years imposed for crime at 16 is functionally life and unconstitutional without consideration of youth | 50 years is survivable and not the functional equivalent of life; thus constitutional as applied | Buffer’s 50-year sentence is a de facto life sentence and unconstitutional because the sentencing court did not consider youth |
| What objective line defines a de facto life term-of-years for juveniles | Case-by-case; appellant argued Miller applies broadly but did not fix a numeric cutoff | Argues a survivability threshold (under ~54 years) such that 50 years is not de facto life; asked court to set a numeric constitutional floor | Court adopts legislative marker: >40 years may be a de facto life sentence; ≤40 years is not a de facto life sentence under Eighth Amendment analysis |
| Whether the sentencing court considered the juvenile’s youth and attendant characteristics as required by Miller | Contended sentencing court failed to account for youth’s mitigating characteristics | State contended sentencing court had discretion and record considerations were sufficient | Court found the record did not show consideration of youth and attendant characteristics; requirement not satisfied |
| Appropriate remedy for successful Miller-based postconviction claim | Vacate sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing under 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 | Sought advancement to second stage of postconviction proceedings rather than immediate resentencing | Remanded for resentencing consistent with section 5-4.5-105 (new sentencing hearing) |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (mandatory life-without-parole for juveniles unconstitutional)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (Miller announced a substantive rule applicable retroactively; requires consideration of youth)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (life without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders barred)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (death penalty for juveniles unconstitutional; juveniles are constitutionally different)
- People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595 (Illinois: Miller applies retroactively on collateral review)
- People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271 (mandatory de facto life terms for juveniles violate Miller)
- People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655 (Miller’s principles apply beyond mandatory life to discretionary life terms absent consideration of youth)
- Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (Eighth Amendment proportionality and evolving standards guidance)
- Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (Eighth Amendment judged by evolving standards of decency)