People v. Buffer
2017 IL App (1st) 142931
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- In 2009 Dimitri Buffer (age 16) was tried as an adult for first‑degree murder after a mandatory transfer; a jury convicted him and specially found he personally discharged the firearm.
- At trial witnesses (some initially inconsistent) and a coconspirator identified Buffer as the shooter; defense presented no evidence.
- The trial court sentenced Buffer to 50 years’ imprisonment (20 years for murder plus a mandatory 25‑year firearm enhancement, yielding a 50‑year aggregate with truth‑in‑sentencing applying).
- Buffer filed a pro se postconviction petition arguing his 50‑year term is a de facto life sentence violating the Eighth Amendment and Illinois proportionate‑penalties clause, relying on Miller and related juvenile‑sentencing cases.
- The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous; the appellate court reversed, concluding the 50‑year term is a de facto life sentence for a 16‑year‑old and vacated the sentence, remanding for resentencing under the juvenile‑specific sentencing statute (730 ILCS 5/5‑4.5‑105).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Buffer’s 50‑year term is a de facto life sentence violative of the Eighth Amendment | Buffer: 50 years (with truth‑in‑sentencing) effectively ensures he will die in prison; Miller protections apply and court must consider youth factors | State: Miller applies only to mandatory life‑without‑parole; trial court had discretion and already considered mitigating youth evidence | Held: The sentence is a de facto life term for a 16‑year‑old and violates Eighth Amendment as applied; vacated and remanded for resentencing under the juvenile sentencing statute |
| Whether Miller applies retroactively on collateral review | Buffer: Miller (and Montgomery) require retroactive application to juveniles sentenced to de facto life | State: (implicit) limitations argued but conceded remedy if remand ordered | Held: Miller is retroactive per Montgomery; Reyes controls that de facto life terms trigger Miller protections |
| Whether trial court’s consideration at original sentencing satisfied juvenile‑specific requirements | Buffer: original sentencing did not show the required individualized consideration of youth characteristics | State: trial court exercised discretion and considered evidence | Held: Record lacked Miller/Montgomery‑style individualized consideration of youth; remand required |
| Appropriate remedy | Buffer: vacatur and resentencing so juvenile factors are considered and statute allowing youth‑specific sentencing applied | State: requested remand only to second‑stage postconviction proceedings; later conceded resentencing under 5‑4.5‑105 if court orders | Held: Vacate sentence and remand for resentencing under 730 ILCS 5/5‑4.5‑105 (new juvenile sentencing statute) |
Key Cases Cited
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (holding death penalty unconstitutional for offenders under 18 and recognizing distinctive characteristics of juveniles)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (prohibiting life without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders; requiring meaningful opportunity for release)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (forbidding mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders; requiring individualized consideration of youth)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. (2016) (holding Miller announces a substantive rule retroactive on collateral review)
- People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271 (Illinois Supreme Court: de facto life terms for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment; remand for resentencing under the juvenile statute)
- Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132 (Wyo. 2014) (state high court finding a 45‑year aggregate for a 16‑year‑old unconstitutional under Miller rationale)
- State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 2013) (holding lengthy term‑of‑years for juvenile can trigger Miller protections because geriatric release does not provide a meaningful opportunity for rehabilitation)