People v. Buffer
2017 IL App (1st) 142931
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- In 2009, 16-year-old Dimitri Buffer was tried as an adult and convicted of first-degree murder; jury found he personally discharged the firearm that killed the victim.
- At trial eyewitness and co-defendant testimony placed Buffer at the scene; some witnesses later admitted initial lies and were impeached.
- The trial court sentenced Buffer to an aggregate 50 years (20-year minimum for murder plus a 25-year mandatory firearm enhancement, with truth-in-sentencing requiring full service).
- Buffer filed a pro se postconviction petition arguing his 50-year term is a de facto life sentence and violates the Eighth Amendment and Illinois proportionate-penalties clause under Miller and related precedent.
- The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous; Buffer appealed. The appellate court reversed, finding the 50-year term a de facto life sentence and remanding for resentencing under the juvenile-specific sentencing statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a 50-year term for a 16-year-old is a de facto life sentence violating the Eighth Amendment | Buffer: 50 years (truth-in-sentencing) effectively guarantees dying in prison; Miller’s protections apply to de facto life terms | State: Miller applies only to mandatory LWOP; this was a discretionary sentence and the court considered youth at sentencing | Held: 50 years is a de facto life sentence for a 16‑year‑old and unconstitutional as applied; remanded for resentencing |
| Whether trial court adequately considered Miller/Montgomery youth factors at original sentencing | Buffer: sentencing court could not meaningfully account for youth because statute/interactions produced an unavoidable life effect | State: trial court exercised discretion and considered mitigation, so Miller not triggered | Held: record lacks the individualized, youth-focused analysis required by Roper/Graham/Miller/Montgomery; sentencing process defective |
| Proper remedy on postconviction appeal | Buffer: vacate and remand for resentencing under juvenile-aware scheme | State: remand only for second-stage postconviction proceedings (or affirm dismissal) | Held: vacate sentence and remand for resentencing under 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (new juvenile-specific sentencing statute) |
| Whether Illinois proportionate-penalties clause independently invalidates the sentence | Buffer: also raised state constitution claim | State: addressed only federal argument | Held: court did not reach the state clause issue after resolving Eighth Amendment claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (juvenile death penalty prohibited) (recognizing juveniles' diminished culpability)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (life-without-parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders unconstitutional) (juvenile youth matters for sentencing)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (mandatory life-without-parole for juveniles unconstitutional) (requires individualized youth-focused sentencing)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (Miller is retroactive on collateral review) (Miller announced substantive rule)
- People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271 (Illinois Supreme Court: de facto life-of-years sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment; remand for resentencing under juvenile-aware statute)
- Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132 (Wyo. 2014) (held aggregate 45-year term for 16-year-old triggered Miller protections)