People v. Bueno
409 P.3d 320
Colo.2018Background
- David Bueno, an inmate, was tried and convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy for the stabbing death of Jeffrey Heird; the jury returned guilty verdicts but the trial court did not impose sentence before post-trial motions.
- Two investigative reports (the Deatrich Report documenting an “ABN Letter” threatening white inmates, and the Smelser Report linking Heird’s death to another suspicious death) were obtained by prosecutors within days of the murder but were not provided to Bueno before trial.
- Defense pursued an alternate-suspect theory and repeatedly sought discovery related to other white inmates; prosecutors repeatedly represented they had disclosed all favorable evidence and opposed production of certain files as irrelevant.
- Bueno’s team later obtained the two reports (first from co-defendant’s counsel, then from the prosecutor’s former working file) more than a year after conviction but before sentencing; Bueno moved for a new trial under Crim. P. 33(c) alleging a Brady violation.
- The trial court found suppression of material, exculpatory evidence and granted a new trial; the court of appeals affirmed in a split decision. The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed timeliness under Rule 33(c) and the Brady issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “entry of judgment” in Crim. P. 33(c) occurs at verdict or after sentencing | "Entry of judgment" occurs when court accepts jury verdict; thus Rule 33(c) deadline began at verdict | "Entry of judgment" includes both verdict and imposition of sentence, so a motion filed before sentencing is timely | Held: "Entry of judgment" requires both a verdict/finding of guilt and imposition of sentence; Bueno’s Rule 33(c) motion filed before sentencing was timely |
| Whether prosecutors suppressed Brady material by failing to disclose the Deatrich and Smelser Reports | No suppression: defense had access to LCF incident files and could have discovered the reports with reasonable diligence | Suppression: prosecution possessed and segregated the reports, repeatedly represented full disclosure, and did not provide the reports to defense; access to voluminous files did not make the reports effectively available | Held: The records were suppressed for Brady purposes—prosecution neither disclosed nor made the reports effectively available |
| Whether the two reports were exculpatory or favorable | Reports were not sufficiently connected to Heird’s murder to be materially exculpatory | Reports supported alternate-suspect theory and impeached investigation scope, so were exculpatory | Held: Reports were exculpatory and favorable to Bueno’s alternate-suspect defense |
| Whether the suppressed reports were material under Brady (i.e., reasonable probability of a different outcome) | Evidence was not material; trial evidence was strong and jury verdict was reliable | Suppressed evidence could have significantly impacted a jury that was once deadlocked and would have aided development of the defense | Held: Evidence was material — there was a reasonable probability the outcome could have been different; trial court did not abuse discretion in granting a new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of material favorable evidence violates due process)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality standard: reasonable probability sufficient to undermine confidence in outcome)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality assessed collectively; good/bad faith irrelevant)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (defense may rely on prosecutor’s representation of full disclosure; defendant need not search for hidden Brady material)
- Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (rejects rule that defendants must scavenge for undisclosed Brady material)
- People v. Dist. Court, 790 P.2d 332 (Colo. 1990) (Colorado Rule 16 disclosure interpreted against Brady principles)