People v. Buckhanan
2017 IL App (1st) 131097
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Defendant Bryant Buckhanan was charged with the 2007 murder of Omari Houston; Samuel E. Adam, Jr. (Junior) represented Buckhanan from January 2008 and had represented him for years prior.
- Gabrielle Gambrell (defendant’s girlfriend) gave a police statement in Sept. 2007 and testified before a grand jury in Feb. 2008; Samuel F. Adam, Sr. (Senior) represented Gambrell and was present for those interviews.
- The State moved to disqualify Junior less than one month before a scheduled October 2009 trial, arguing (1) possible exchange of confidential information between Senior and Junior and (2) appearance of impropriety if Senior were called to impeach or be called as a witness.
- At the disqualification hearing Senior testified he did not recall one disputed statement attributed to Gambrell and denied sharing confidential client information with Junior; the trial court found no unethical disclosure but granted disqualification based on a potential conflict/appearance issues.
- The appellate court held the State failed to show an actual conflict or a sufficiently likely potential conflict to overcome the Sixth Amendment presumption in favor of counsel of choice; the disqualification was reversible error and required a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Buckhanan's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a serious potential conflict existed that justified disqualifying Junior | Senior’s representation of a State witness could give Junior access to confidential info or force Junior to call Senior, creating a conflict | Junior and Senior are solo practitioners who did not share confidential information; no real inconsistency in Gambrell’s statements; defendant waived any conflict | No — State failed to show an actual or sufficiently likely potential conflict to overcome presumption favoring counsel of choice |
| Whether the appearance of impropriety alone can justify disqualification | Jury learning defense counsel’s father represented a prosecution witness would create appearance of impropriety warranting disqualification | Appearance alone is insufficient absent actual impropriety; alternatives (stipulation to Senior’s presence/testimony) could cure any appearance | No — appearance alone, where court found no unethical conduct, was insufficient to disqualify counsel |
| Remedy for improper disqualification of counsel | Disqualification was within court’s discretion | Disqualification violated Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice; reversible structural error | Reversed and remanded for a new trial — disqualification constituted structural error under Gonzalez-Lopez |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Holmes, 141 Ill. 2d 204 (Ill. 1990) (presumption in favor of defendant’s counsel of choice)
- Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (U.S. 1988) (waiver of chosen counsel permissible only when actual/serious potential conflict shown)
- Gonzalez-Lopez v. United States, 548 U.S. 140 (U.S. 2006) (erroneous deprivation of counsel of choice is structural error)
- People v. Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d 354 (Ill. 2004) (two-step Illinois test for disqualifying defense counsel: existence of conflict and weight of threatened interests)
- United States v. Turner, 594 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2010) (courts should consider likelihood of conflict and alternatives to disqualification)
- People v. Robinson, 79 Ill. 2d 147 (Ill. 1980) (defendant may waive conflict by a knowing, intelligent waiver)
- United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1986) (skepticism that mere appearance of impropriety justifies overriding Sixth Amendment rights)