People v. Brown, 14 Cal. App. 5th 320

Background

Defendant Chester Llewell Brown was convicted by a jury of two counts of human trafficking (§ 236.1(c)) involving two minors (B., 17; D., 14). He was sentenced to 21 years 4 months and appealed.
Facts supporting conviction: texts and internet escort ads tied to defendant’s phone; B.’s testimony that defendant recruited, controlled, and profited from her prostitution; physical abuse and threats; 911 calls indicating kidnapping/duress; officer and cell‑tower evidence; jail informant testimony about defendant’s pimping of underage girls.
D. (14) did not testify; the trial court admitted her out‑of‑court oral statements and texts under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule (Evid. Code § 1223). Defense argued Proposition 35 (Evidence Code § 1161) made D. immune and thus she could not be a coconspirator.
Defendant also challenged § 236.1 as void for vagueness and argued overlap with the pandering statute (§ 266i) created unfair/ discriminatory charging and sentencing risk (Batchelder‑type claim).
Defendant challenged Evidence Code § 1161(b) (excluding prior commercial sexual history of trafficking victims) as violating due process, confrontation, and right to present a defense; the court found no prejudice given the admitted background and record.

Issues

Issue	People’s Argument	Brown’s Argument	Held
Admissibility of D.’s statements under coconspirator exception (Evid. Code § 1223)	D. acted as an uncharged coconspirator ("bottom bitch"); statements in furtherance admissible to prove defendant’s liability	Proposition 35/Evidence Code §1161 made D. a protected trafficking victim and thus not a coconspirator for purpose of admitting her statements	Admitted. Immunity/evidentiary protection for trafficking victims does not bar treating an uncharged person as coconspirator; coconspirator exception applies when statements further the conspiracy; Confrontation claim not shown because statements were not shown to be testimonial.
Vagueness / overlapping statutes: §236.1 (trafficking) vs §266i (pandering)	Statutes clearly define prohibited conduct; defendant had notice; prosecutor may charge either offense	Overlap produced unfair notice and enabled arbitrary or discriminatory charging (lesser penalty exists for pandering)	Rejected. Batchelder controls: overlapping statutes that clearly define conduct do not violate due process simply because penalties differ; prosecutorial charging discretion allowed absent invidious discrimination.
Constitutionality of Evidence Code §1161(b) (exclusion of prior commercial sexual history of trafficking victims)	Protects victims, does not impair defendant’s rights; statutory language understood by courts	Statute prejudicially labels alleged victims and limits defendant’s ability to impeach/present defense	Rejected. Facial challenge fails; as‑applied not shown because record already contained evidence both girls previously prostituted and defense theory relied on that background, so no prejudice shown.
Confrontation Clause as to D.’s statements	Statements were nontestimonial or admissible under hearsay exception	Some statements violated confrontation rights	Rejected. Defendant did not demonstrate statements were testimonial; evidentiary exceptions apply.

Key Cases Cited

In re M.D., 231 Cal.App.4th 993 (Cal. Ct. App.) (Prop. 35 protects trafficked minors and affects evidentiary scope)
People v. Bogan, 152 Cal.App.4th 1070 (Cal. Ct. App.) (uncharged prostitutes may be treated as coconspirators; coconspirator exception applied)
Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 (U.S. 1932) (where statute shows legislative policy of non‑punishment for one party, that policy can limit conspiracy liability)
Batchelder v. United States, 442 U.S. 114 (U.S. 1979) (overlapping criminal statutes with different penalties do not violate due process so long as each clearly defines prohibited conduct)
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (U.S. 1983) (void‑for‑vagueness doctrine: statutes must give fair notice and avoid standardless enforcement)