People v. Brown
2017 IL App (1st) 140508-B
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- On July 3, 2013, Joseph Brown (age 20) sold heroin; he was charged July 29, 2013 and turned 21 on July 30, 2013.
- After a bench trial (Nov. 18, 2013) he was convicted of possession of >1 but <15 grams of heroin with intent to deliver (Class 1 felony).
- Because of two prior Class 2 felony convictions, the trial court applied the Class X recidivist statute (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b)) and sentenced Brown as a Class X offender to six years.
- On initial appeal (Brown I) the appellate court interpreted "over the age of 21 years" as referring to age at time of the offense and vacated the sentence; the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Smith directed the appellate court to vacate Brown I.
- On remand this opinion addresses Brown’s constitutional challenges to measuring Class X eligibility by age at conviction rather than at offense: ex post facto, due process (notice and arbitrariness), and equal protection. The court affirms Brown’s sentence and orders a mittimus correction to reflect the correct offense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ex post facto | Statute is not retroactive because it was enacted before the offense; fair warning exists. | Measuring eligibility by age at conviction punishes an event (21st birthday) after the offense and increases punishment after commission. | Not ex post facto: statute enacted in 1977; retroactivity requires application to events before enactment; Brown had fair notice here. |
| Due process — notice | Statute’s text gives fair warning: age at conviction is clear. | Defendants under 21 cannot know at offense time whether delays will push conviction past 21, so lack fair notice. | No due process violation on these facts: Brown committed offense <1 month before turning 21 so had adequate notice. |
| Due process — arbitrariness | Legislature may base sentencing on age at conviction; precedent supports post-offense changes affecting sentencing. | It is arbitrary to increase punishment based on passage of time unrelated to culpability or rehabilitation. | Not arbitrary: analogous schemes upheld (Griffin, Fiveash); statute bears rational relationship to legis. goals. |
| Equal protection | Age classification triggers rational-basis review and is permissible if rationally related to legitimate goal. | Similarly situated defendants may receive different sentences solely due to timing of conviction, which is arbitrary. | No equal protection violation: classification upheld under rational-basis and controlling precedent. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Smith, 2016 IL 119659 (Illinois Supreme Court) (addressed timing for Class X eligibility)
- In re Griffin, 92 Ill. 2d 48 (Ill. 1982) (upheld use of age at dispositional hearing for juvenile commitment)
- People v. Fiveash, 2015 IL 117669 (Ill. 2015) (upheld charging/sentencing consequences tied to age at charging/time of prosecution)
- Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (U.S. 1990) (definitions for ex post facto analysis)
- Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (U.S. 1997) (retrospectivity and ex post facto principles)
- People v. Pena, 321 Ill. App. 3d 538 (Ill. App. 2001) (ex post facto test discussion)
- People v. Criss, 307 Ill. App. 3d 888 (Ill. App. 1999) (fair warning and ex post facto purposes)