People v. Brown
2017 IL App (1st) 140508-B
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- On July 3, 2013, Joseph Brown (age 20) was arrested for selling heroin; he turned 21 on July 30, 2013.
- Charged July 29, 2013 with possession with intent to deliver >1–<15 grams (Class 1 felony).
- After a bench trial (Nov. 18, 2013) Brown was convicted; trial court applied the Class X recidivist statute (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b)) based on his age at conviction and, given two prior Class 2+ felonies, sentenced him as a Class X offender to 6 years.
- In Brown I the appellate court held Brown ineligible for Class X because he was under 21 at the time of the offense; the Illinois Supreme Court’s People v. Smith reversed that statutory interpretation and directed vacatur of Brown I.
- On remand Brown raised constitutional challenges (ex post facto, due process, equal protection) to calculating Class X eligibility by age at conviction rather than age at offense.
- The appellate court affirmed Brown’s sentence but ordered correction of the mittimus to reflect the correct offense (possession with intent to deliver heroin >1–<15 grams).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ex post facto | Statute not ex post facto because it was enacted earlier and gives fair warning | Brown: applying Class X based on age at conviction punishes him for an event (turning 21) after the offense and increases punishment after commission | Not ex post facto — statute was enacted long before offense, so not retrospective; as-applied fair warning existed here (birthday shortly after offense) |
| Due process — fair notice | State: statute’s text gives clear notice (age at conviction) | Brown: defendants <21 cannot predict if delays will push conviction past their 21st birthday, so lack fair notice | No due process violation as applied — under facts here Brown reasonably could foresee conviction after his 21st birthday |
| Due process — arbitrariness | State: precedent allows use of age at later event (charging/sentencing) | Brown: basing harsher sentence on passage of time (court delays, docketing) is arbitrary and unrelated to culpability/rehabilitation | No violation — comparable statutory schemes were upheld (Griffin, Fiveash); court rejects arbitrariness challenge |
| Equal protection | State: classification by age is rationally related to legislative goals | Brown: similarly situated defendants may receive different punishments solely on whether conviction occurs before/after 21 | Rational-basis standard satisfied under controlling precedent; no equal protection violation |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Smith, 2016 IL 119659 (supreme court directed reconsideration of Brown I and treated age at conviction as operative)
- Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997) (ex post facto doctrine requires law be retrospective and disadvantage the offender)
- People v. Griffin, 92 Ill. 2d 48 (1982) (upheld using age at dispositional hearing to determine juvenile commitment eligibility)
- People v. Fiveash, 2015 IL 117669 (2015) (upheld prosecuting/penalizing based on age at time of charging; due process/rational-basis analysis)
- People v. Pena, 321 Ill. App. 3d 538 (2001) (articulates two-prong ex post facto test: retrospectivity and disadvantage)
- People v. Magee, 374 Ill. App. 3d 1024 (2007) (appellate court authority to order clerk to correct mittimus)