People v. Brown, C078620

Background

Defendant Chester Brown was convicted by a jury of two counts of human trafficking for exploiting two minors (B., age 17; D., age 14) who were found in his car with escort ads, condoms, and prostitution-related materials; defendant sentenced to 21 years 4 months.
B. testified that Brown recruited her to Stockton, posted sexualized ads and photos, directed prices, collected money, used threats and physical violence, and controlled her movements; D. did not testify.
The prosecution introduced extensive text messages and oral statements by D. (and texts from defendant’s phone); the trial court admitted D.’s out-of-court statements under the coconspirator exception to hearsay.
Defendant argued (1) D. could not be treated as an uncharged coconspirator because Proposition 35 shields trafficking victims from prosecution, rendering her statements inadmissible hearsay, (2) the human‑trafficking statute is void for vagueness/overlaps with pandering (different penalties) enabling selective enforcement, and (3) Evidence Code §1161(b) (excluding victims’ prior commercial sex evidence) violates due process, confrontation, and the right to present a defense.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting the challenges and holding D. could be treated as an uncharged coconspirator for admissibility purposes, Batchelder governs overlapping statutes, and §1161(b) is constitutional as applied.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of D.’s out‑of‑court statements via coconspirator exception	D.’s statements were in furtherance of the conspiracy to traffic B.; admissible under Evidence Code §1223	D. cannot be a coconspirator as to count charging her as a victim because Prop. 35 (Evidence Code §1161(a)) shields trafficking victims from prosecution, so her statements are inadmissible hearsay and violate confrontation	Admissible: Prop. 35’s evidentiary/prosecutorial protections do not bar treating an uncharged victim as a coconspirator for the hearsay exception; many texts also constitute party/adoptive admissions; confrontation claim not shown because statements were non‑testimonial
Confrontation Clause challenge to use of D.’s statements	(People) statements not testimonial; coconspirator exception and admissions control	(Brown) admission of non‑testifying declarant’s statements violated Crawford / confrontation rights	Rejected: defendant did not demonstrate statements were testimonial; coconspirator exception and admission doctrines apply
Vagueness / overlap between trafficking (§236.1(c)) and pandering (§266i) producing unfair notice or selective enforcement	(People) statutes clearly define prohibited conduct; Batchelder permits prosecution under either overlapping statute absent invidious discrimination	(Brown) overlap creates vague notice and allows arbitrary/prosecutorially discriminatory charging because trafficking carries greater penalties than pandering	Rejected: Batchelder controls—overlapping statutes that clearly define conduct satisfy due process; selective‑enforcement claim not shown and requires proof of invidious motive
Constitutionality of Evidence Code §1161(b) (excluding prior commercial sex evidence)	Statute protects trafficking victims’ credibility from impeachment and is consistent with trial practice; wording ("victim") is contextual	(Brown) §1161(b) denies due process, confrontation, and right to present a defense; prejudicial to defendant because it labels witnesses "victims" before trial	Rejected: facial challenge fails; as‑applied claim fails because record already contained evidence of victims’ prior prostitution (so exclusion caused no prejudice); trial language used "alleged victim/complaining witness"

Key Cases Cited

In re M.D., 231 Cal.App.4th 993 (Cal. Ct. App.) (Prop. 35 intended to treat trafficked minors as victims and limit evidence against them)
People v. Bogan, 152 Cal.App.4th 1070 (Cal. Ct. App.) (uncharged prostitutes may be treated as coconspirators when they assist in exploitation)
People v. Eberhardt, 169 Cal.App.3d 292 (Cal. Ct. App.) (immunity or discharge of a coconspirator does not necessarily bar use of that person’s acts/statements against other conspirators)
Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 (U.S. Supreme Court) (where the substantive statute manifests a legislative policy to leave certain accomplices unpunished, conspiracy liability may not be applied to them)
Batchelder v. United States, 442 U.S. 114 (U.S. Supreme Court) (overlapping statutes with different penalties do not make either vague; prosecutor may choose which statute to charge absent invidious discrimination)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. Supreme Court) (distinguishes testimonial from non‑testimonial hearsay for Confrontation Clause analysis)
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (U.S. Supreme Court) (void‑for‑vagueness doctrine requires minimal guidelines to prevent arbitrary enforcement)