People v. Brown, 19 N.E.3d 733

In Feb. 2008 Michael B. Brown shot and killed two brothers; he was charged with multiple counts including two counts of first-degree murder and claimed self-defense.
At trial defense counsel and Brown jointly decided not to request a second-degree murder instruction; the court canvassed Brown, who stated he understood and agreed the issue was too confusing for the jury.
The jury convicted Brown of two counts of first-degree murder; the court sentenced him to natural life on each murder conviction (concurrent) plus a 30-year term on an aggravated-battery conviction.
Brown filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance: trial counsel misadvised him about the sentencing exposure and failed to inform him that a natural life sentence was mandatory if convicted of both murders, which influenced his decision not to request the second-degree instruction.
The trial court dismissed the petition at the first stage as frivolous and patently without merit; Brown appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded for second-stage proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Brown pleaded the gist of an ineffective-assistance claim	Trial court: decision not to give second-degree instruction was strategic and canvass shows voluntary waiver; petition frivolous	Brown: counsel misadvised him about mandatory natural life exposure, impairing his ability to make an informed decision to waive second-degree instruction	Reversed: petition states the gist of an ineffective-assistance claim and survives first-stage dismissal
Whether counsel’s advice was objectively deficient	State: tactical choice immune from IAC unless shown as nonstrategic	Brown: counsel’s advice was based on a legal misapprehension about sentencing, not strategy	Argueably deficient: a strategy based on fundamental legal error is not protected
Whether prejudice is arguable under Strickland at first stage	State: outcome would be the same; no prejudice	Brown: if second-degree instruction had been given, reasonable probability jury would convict of second-degree instead of first-degree	Prejudice is arguably shown at first stage — reasonable probability jury could have reached second-degree guilty verdict
Whether evidence supported a second-degree instruction	State: conflicting testimony undermines it	Brown: evidence supporting self-defense and mitigating factors would permit second-degree instruction	Court: evidence was sufficient to make it arguable that a second-degree instruction should have been tendered

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (procedural-standard for counsel withdrawal in collateral proceedings)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two-prong ineffective-assistance standard)
People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56 (Illinois postconviction three-stage process)
People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1 (summary dismissal standard: no arguable basis in law or fact)
People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239 ("gist" standard for first-stage petitions)
People v. DuPree, 397 Ill. App. 3d 719 (first-stage need only make ineffective-assistance arguable)
People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194 (applying Strickland in Illinois)
People v. Manning, 241 Ill. 2d 319 (prejudice definition under Strickland)
People v. Jackson, 205 Ill. 2d 247 (prejudice not solely outcome-determinative)
People v. Pugh, 157 Ill. 2d 1 (strategy defense rejects counsel error based on legal misapprehension)
People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104 (definition and elements of second-degree murder)
People v. Everette, 141 Ill. 2d 147 (threshold for instructing jury on lesser mitigated offense)
People v. Washington, 2012 IL 110283 (obligation to instruct on second-degree when evidence supports self-defense)
Lockett v. People, 82 Ill. 2d 546 (same duty to instruct on lesser offense when justified)
People v. Brocksmith, 162 Ill. 2d 224 (defendant’s right to decide whether to request lesser-included instruction)