People v. Brown
2013 IL 114196
| Ill. | 2014Background
- Tiffany Brown, a Chicago police officer, deposited a $1,000,000 check and accompanying settlement letter at her credit union on Aug. 31, 2006; the check was purportedly from Six Flags Great America and payable to Brown.
- Credit union staff quickly suspected the check was counterfeit (routing number missing a digit, unusual paper/printing); Chase confirmed the check was not drawn on its account and the credit union placed a permanent hold.
- Investigation showed no lawsuit or authorized signatory ("Bryan Douglas") existed; Brown’s sister Abeni had a history of identity-theft schemes and was connected to similar documents; Brown endorsed the check and communicated misleading statements to credit-union employees.
- Brown was indicted on multiple counts including forgery by making the check (720 ILCS 5/17-3(a)(1)), forgery by delivery (a)(2), attempted theft (delivery), and official misconduct; after bench trial she was convicted on counts I–VI and sentenced to probation.
- The appellate court vacated some official-misconduct counts and one forgery count (delivery) under one-act/one-crime but affirmed the forgery-by-making conviction, reasoning Brown’s endorsement constituted “making.”
- The Illinois Supreme Court held Brown’s endorsement alone did not constitute making a counterfeit check that was already forged at creation, and found insufficient evidence that Brown actually created the counterfeit check; it reversed the forgery-by-making conviction and modified the judgment to leave only the attempted-theft conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Brown) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether endorsing a check can constitute “making” a document under 720 ILCS 5/17-3(a)(1) | Endorsement that enables negotiation can render an instrument capable of defrauding and thus qualifies as a "making" | Endorsement alone does not establish that defendant "made" or created a counterfeit instrument | Endorsement may constitute "making" only when it renders an otherwise valid instrument capable of defrauding; not when the instrument is already counterfeit at creation |
| Sufficiency of evidence that Brown actually created (made) the counterfeit check | Circumstantial evidence (endorsement, lies to bank staff, connections to sister with fraud history) permits inference Brown made the check | No direct or circumstantial proof ties Brown to creating or altering the check; investigator found no evidence she created it | Reversal: State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Brown made the check; conviction for forgery by making reversed |
| Mootness of challenge to forgery-by-making given other convictions and single sentence | Because attempted theft (greater offense) remains and single sentence imposed, challenge to surplus conviction is immaterial | The forgery-by-making conviction appears on sentencing order and can cause collateral consequences; issue is not moot | Not moot—the Court reviewed and reversed the forgery-by-making conviction to protect against prejudice and preserve judicial integrity |
| Remedy and effect on judgment/sentencing | State deferred to court’s treatment of convictions | Requested acquittal on insufficiency to avoid retrial and double jeopardy consequences | Because reversal based on insufficiency bars retrial, the proper remedy is judgment of acquittal; sentencing order modified to reflect sole remaining conviction of attempted theft |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Christison, 396 Ill. 549 (Ill. 1947) (forgery by making is complete when the false instrument is created with intent to defraud)
- People v. Epping, 17 Ill. 2d 557 (Ill. 1959) (a false endorsement that renders an otherwise valid instrument capable of defrauding may constitute forgery)
- People v. Connell, 91 Ill. App. 3d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (forged endorsement on valid check can be proof of a "making")
- People v. Campa, 217 Ill. 2d 243 (Ill. 2005) (court will not decide nonessential issues or render advisory opinions)
- People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92 (Ill. 2007) (appellate review considers all evidence in the light most favorable to prosecution but need not discuss every possible inference)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt; standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence)
- Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1994) (state bears burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable doubt)