53 Cal.App.5th 919
Cal. Ct. App.2020Background
- In 2016 Brooks threw boiling water on his girlfriend, causing second-degree burns and permanent scarring risk; he also assaulted her with a table leg (jury hung on that count) and damaged a police vehicle while detained. He was convicted of mayhem, assault with a deadly weapon, domestic violence, vandalism, and resisting an officer; enhancements for personal infliction of great bodily injury were found true.
- The trial court found three prior convictions and imposed two five-year serious-felony enhancements under Pen. Code § 667(a)(1); the court struck a prior "strike" (Romero) and sentenced Brooks to 27 years 4 months.
- After sentencing, Senate Bill No. 1393 (effective Jan. 1, 2019) gave trial courts discretion to strike prior serious-felony enhancements; this court remanded for the trial court to decide whether to strike the § 667(a)(1) enhancements.
- On remand another judge (Judge Meyer) reviewed records and briefs, declined to strike the two five-year enhancements, and explained she considered Brooks had already received a break (the Romero strike), his criminal history, and that punishment was the primary objective for this crime.
- Brooks appealed the remand ruling, arguing he was entitled to have the original sentencing judge hear the remand motion, that the remand judge misstated sentencing law (overweighting punishment and relying on ballot-proposition speculation), and that counsel was ineffective for not raising these issues below.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Brooks) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendant was entitled to have the original sentencing judge hear the SB 1393 remand motion | No — remand was limited and not a full resentencing; no authority requires the same judge; remand judge may act | Brooks argued he is entitled, or at least the original judge should preside if available; public-policy reasons favor same judge | Not entitled. Remand did not require the original judge; no precedent creates such a right and court declines to make one |
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to strike § 667(a)(1) enhancements on remand | The remand judge properly exercised discretion, considered Romero relief already granted, Brooks’s criminal history, and appropriate sentencing objectives | Brooks contended the judge misstated the law (said punishment, not rehabilitation), relied on improper factors (speculation about propositions), and thus abused discretion | No abuse. The judge acknowledged rehabilitation as a goal but reasonably prioritized punishment here; statements about propositions were not reversible error |
| Whether Brooks forfeited the arguments and whether counsel was ineffective for failing to raise them below | Forfeiture applies to sentencing-practice complaints, but the court may reach ineffective-assistance prejudice on the merits | Counsel ineffective for failing to preserve issues; appellate review warranted | Court reached merits, found no prejudice and thus no ineffective assistance: issues lacked merit |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996) (trial court may dismiss strike priors in the interest of justice)
- People v. Arbuckle, 22 Cal.3d 749 (1978) (plea agreements imply sentencing judge will impose sentence when judge retains sentencing discretion)
- People v. Lewis, 50 Cal.3d 262 (1990) (preferential remand to original judge on death-penalty procedural matters when available)
- People v. Buckhalter, 26 Cal.4th 20 (2001) (remand for sentencing need not entail full resentencing procedures)
- People v. Rodriguez, 17 Cal.4th 253 (1998) (appellate court may remand with limited directions rather than full resentencing)
- People v. Scott, 9 Cal.4th 331 (1994) (claims about exercise of sentencing discretion forfeited if not raised in trial court)
- People v. Farnam, 28 Cal.4th 107 (2002) (ineffective-assistance prejudice requires reasonable probability of different result)
- People v. Kelly, 72 Cal.App.4th 842 (1999) (trial judge may consider the aggregate sentence the judge thinks appropriate when exercising discretion)
- People v. Stevens, 205 Cal.App.3d 1452 (1988) (judge’s subjective sentencing views acceptable when guided by statutory factors)
- People v. Swanson, 140 Cal.App.3d 571 (1983) (a sentencing judge cannot "reason backwards" to justify an arbitrary sentence)