People v. Brooks
D070918M
| Cal. Ct. App. | Sep 22, 2017Background
- Defendant Michael Brooks pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of ammunition and admitted a prison prior; other drug-related counts were dismissed. Sentence: 3 years plus 1-year prior (suspended) with 3 years formal probation.
- Probation order contained 29 terms recommended by probation, including: (1) participate in a counseling/educational program “as directed by the probation officer,” (2) follow “all standard terms of probation,” and (3) pay a $7 per-test drug-testing fee pursuant to a county ordinance and Penal Code § 1203.1ab.
- Facts supporting probation terms: during a probation search deputies found methamphetamine, paraphernalia, needles, and three live 9mm rounds in Brooks’s residence. Brooks had a documented history of substance abuse.
- Brooks appealed without a certificate of probable cause and despite an appellate waiver in his plea agreement; he challenged three probation terms as vague, an improper delegation, or unauthorized under § 1203.1ab.
- The Court of Appeal held the appeal was cognizable (challenges arose after plea and did not affect plea validity) and reviewed the probation conditions on the merits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether ordering participation in a “counseling/educational program as directed by the probation officer” is unconstitutionally vague / an improper delegation | People: The probation report and sentencing discussion made plain the program meant a drug-and-alcohol course; defendant had notice. | Brooks: The phrase grants unbounded discretion to probation and fails to give sufficient notice as to program type. | Modified: condition is vague as written; remanded/modified to require participation in a drug-and-alcohol counseling/educational program as directed by PO. |
| 2) Whether the directive to “follow all standard terms of probation” is unconstitutionally vague | People: The court imposed an extensive set of specific standard terms recommended by probation; the phrase is harmless/superfluous. | Brooks: Phrase is vague and could bind him to undisclosed conditions. | Struck: phrase is superfluous and potentially vague; probation term No. 9 stricken. |
| 3) Whether court may impose a drug-testing fee under Penal Code § 1203.1ab when defendant was convicted only of ammunition possession | People: Because controlled substances were found in the same residence and the court considered dismissed drug facts under Harvey, the conviction “involved” drugs and fee is authorized. | Brooks: § 1203.1ab authorizes testing fees only when the conviction itself involves a controlled substance; his sole conviction was ammunition possession. | Reversed (as to fee): § 1203.1ab applies only when the conviction is for an offense involving controlled substances; the fee must be stricken. |
| 4) Whether appeal is barred by appellate-waiver or lack of certificate of probable cause | People: No certificate and waiver bar appeal. | Brooks: Challenges arose after plea and do not affect plea validity; waiver did not encompass unforeseen probation terms. | Allowed: Appeal permitted under rule allowing post-plea sentencing challenges; waiver did not preclude challenge to probation conditions imposed after plea. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Harvey, 25 Cal.3d 754 (defendant may waive right to bar consideration of dismissed counts at sentencing)
- People v. Cuevas, 44 Cal.4th 374 (appeals from pleas may reach sentencing issues arising after plea)
- People v. Lopez, 66 Cal.App.4th 615 (vagueness doctrine and notice limits on probation conditions)
- In re Sheena K., 40 Cal.4th 875 (court may modify unconstitutional probation conditions to render them constitutional)
- People v. Panizzon, 13 Cal.4th 68 (limitations on breadth of appellate waivers; unforeseeable post-plea errors not waived)