People v. Brooks
S099274M
| Cal. | Jun 19, 2017Background
- In March 1999 defendant Brooks kidnapped and murdered Kerr; evidence showed Brooks placed Kerr in her car, drove away, and Kerr and her car were set on fire; Brooks had earlier expressed intent to "blow up" or set Kerr's car on fire.
- At trial the jury found true both a kidnapping-murder and a torture-murder special circumstance and sentenced Brooks to death.
- The trial court instructed the jury using CALJIC No. 8.81.17.1 (1999) for the kidnapping-murder special circumstance, which did not include the independent felonious-purpose requirement.
- The independent felonious-purpose rule (that the felony must be for a purpose independent of an intended murder) applied to crimes in March 1999, but the 1999 CALJIC instruction’s use note mistakenly suggested otherwise.
- On appeal and rehearing the California Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte on the independent felonious-purpose rule as to the kidnapping-murder special circumstance.
- The court vacated the jury’s true finding on the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance allegation but affirmed the judgment in all other respects, including the death sentence, because the torture-murder special circumstance remained valid and the jury could consider the same facts as aggravating circumstances at penalty.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether court had sua sponte duty to instruct on independent felonious-purpose rule for kidnapping-murder special circumstance | The Attorney General: evidence showed Brooks moved Kerr knowing she was alive, supporting an independent kidnapping purpose, so no instruction was required | Brooks: evidence supported inference that kidnapping was solely to facilitate murder; court should have instructed that kidnapping incidental to murder cannot support the special circumstance | Court: Duty to instruct arose because evidence could reasonably lead jury to infer kidnapping was solely to kill; failure to instruct prejudicial; vacated kidnapping-murder special-circumstance finding |
| Whether the instructional omission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to the special-circumstance finding | AG: evidence supported an independent kidnapping purpose, so error was harmless | Brooks: instructional error could have affected the jury’s finding | Court: could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt the error was harmless; vacated that finding |
| Whether vacating kidnapping-murder special circumstance requires reversing death sentence | AG: other valid special circumstance (torture-murder) and facts could be used as aggravating factors at penalty; death sentence stands | Brooks: invalidation of a special circumstance undermines death eligibility | Court: Death sentence affirmed because torture-murder special circumstance remained and the jury could consider the kidnapping facts as aggravating under §190.3(a) |
| Whether the claim could be raised first in petition for rehearing | AG: procedural default but argued case law often considers new issues in capital cases | Brooks: raised the instructional error in petition for rehearing | Court: exercised discretion to consider the newly raised capital claim because it was meritorious and resolvable on the appellate record |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Mendoza, 24 Cal.4th (clarifies independent felonious-purpose requirement for felony-murder special circumstances)
- People v. Green, 27 Cal.3d (same principle regarding felony-murder independence)
- People v. Raley, 2 Cal.4th (kidnapping-murder special circumstance requires purpose apart from murder)
- People v. Brents, 53 Cal.4th (discusses scope of kidnapping-murder special circumstance)
- People v. Kimble, 44 Cal.3d (independent felonious-purpose rule not an element; instruction required if evidence supports contrary inference)
- People v. Harris, 43 Cal.4th (instructional duty context for felony-murder rule)
- People v. Monterroso, 34 Cal.4th (duty to instruct when evidence could show no independent felonious purpose)
- People v. D'Arcy, 48 Cal.4th (same instructional-duty principle)
- People v. Riccardi, 54 Cal.4th (prejudice standard for omitted instruction on independent felonious purpose)
- People v. Diaz, 60 Cal.4th (instructions conveying unfamiliar legal rules may require sua sponte instruction)
- Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212 (invalidation of a sentencing factor does not necessarily preclude a death sentence if other aggravating factors remain)
- People v. Bonilla, 41 Cal.4th (second special circumstance may be superfluous for death-eligibility but facts may still be aggravating)