2018 IL App (3d) 150807
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background
- In July 2008 Dameko Brickhouse was charged with two counts of armed robbery after Rochelle and Jeffrey Hicks identified him; victims described a silver handgun and a Black White Sox hat. Brickhouse was convicted by a jury and sentenced to concurrent 30‑year terms; convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.
- Police conducted three interviews. During the first interview (audio/video), as officers sought consent to record and before Miranda warnings were read, Brickhouse asked something about a lawyer; the officer then read Miranda warnings (~30 seconds later), Brickhouse initialed and signed the waiver, and proceeded to speak. Later interviews produced additional statements; one was not recorded.
- Trial counsel did not move to suppress any of Brickhouse’s statements, explaining at trial that the recorded statement was exculpatory (corroborated an alibi: drywall/plaster on his person) and that she saw no suppression basis for the later statements.
- Brickhouse filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance for failure to move to suppress; the petition survived initial review, proceeded to a third‑stage evidentiary hearing, and was denied by the trial court after testimony from Brickhouse, the interviewing detective, and trial counsel.
- On appeal from the third‑stage denial, Brickhouse argued his pre‑Miranda remark was an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel, that the police should have ceased questioning, that counsel was deficient for not moving to suppress, and that he was prejudiced because the suppressed statements were incriminating.
- The appellate court affirmed: it found Brickhouse’s early question/comment about a lawyer ambiguous (not a clear invocation), the officer responded appropriately by promptly reading Miranda warnings, counsel’s suppression decision was reasonable trial strategy, and Brickhouse failed to show prejudice or involuntariness.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Brickhouse) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Brickhouse clearly invoked the right to counsel during the first interview | The recorded remark was ambiguous and not an unequivocal request; under an objective test a reasonable officer would not treat it as invocation | Brickhouse asserts his question about a lawyer was an invocation of the right to counsel that required interrogation to stop | Held: Ambiguous; not a clear invocation. Officer promptly read Miranda warnings and Brickhouse then waived and spoke. |
| Whether police violated Miranda by continuing interrogation after the purported invocation | Police acted appropriately; they clarified and promptly administered Miranda warnings, so no Edwards/Winsett bar was triggered | Brickhouse contends police should have ceased questioning and secured counsel before continuing | Held: No Miranda/Edwards violation—statement preceded warnings and was equivocal; officer’s immediate reading cured any uncertainty. |
| Whether trial counsel was ineffective for not filing motions to suppress | Counsel’s choice not to file was reasonable strategy (recorded statement aided alibi) and no viable suppression motion existed for the later statements | Brickhouse argues counsel’s failure was deficient and not strategic given incriminating second/third statements | Held: Not ineffective—decision was strategic, within professional judgment; no prejudice shown because suppression would likely have failed. |
| Whether any error was prejudicial such that new trial is required | The State maintains statements would not have been suppressed and evidence was sufficient absent them | Brickhouse asserts prejudice because the later statements were incriminating and likely affected the verdict | Held: No prejudice; the motion to suppress likely would have been denied and Brickhouse failed to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (constitutional rule requiring warnings before custodial interrogation)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (an ambiguous request for counsel does not require cessation of questioning)
- Patterson v. Illinois, 217 Ill. 2d 407 (Strickland framework and suppression‑motion prejudice standard)
- Winsett v. People, 153 Ill. 2d 335 (police-initiated interrogation after invocation of counsel and effect on admissibility)
- Krueger v. People, 82 Ill. 2d 305 (examples of ambiguous requests during interrogation not amounting to invocation)
- Schuning v. People, 399 Ill. App. 3d 1073 (objective test for invocation of counsel)
- Shabaz v. United States, 579 F.3d 815 (question about attorney before warnings not an unequivocal invocation)
- Wysinger v. United States, 683 F.3d 784 (initial question before warnings insufficient to invoke counsel)
- Lord v. Duckworth, 29 F.3d 1216 (mentioning attorney does not necessarily invoke right)
- Martin v. People, 236 Ill. App. 3d 112 (failure to move to suppress generally trial strategy; suppression may be required only for truly involuntary statements)
- Perry v. People, 224 Ill. 2d 312 (trial strategy deference; ineffective‑assistance threshold for strategy failures)
- Pendleton v. People, 223 Ill. 2d 458 (three‑stage postconviction process and standard of review)
- Rapp v. People, 343 Ill. App. 3d 414 (third‑stage evidentiary hearing standards)
- Best v. Best, 223 Ill. 2d 342 (manifest‑weight standard for reversing factual findings)