People v. Brand
148 N.E.3d 848
Ill. App. Ct.2020Background
- On Nov. 3, 2015, defendant Crosetti Brand forced entry into ex-girlfriend Anita Shannon’s apartment, shoved and choked her, pointed a gun at her 15-year-old son, and took Shannon’s 2014 Kia Sedona. Shannon’s son witnessed part of the attack.
- The Sedona was gone when Shannon looked out the window; five days later she received a Facebook message from a user named “Masetti Meech” (a name Brand had used while dating Shannon) telling her where to recover the car.
- On Nov. 21, 2015, Shannon received another Facebook message from the same account containing specific threats and a list of street numbers tied to Shannon’s family and workplace; Shannon testified those references were known only to her close circle.
- Police arrested Brand on Nov. 24, 2015; officers produced photographs of a personal property bag with car keys that Shannon identified at the station, but chain-of-custody testimony about the keys was limited.
- After a bench trial Brand was convicted of aggravated domestic battery, home invasion (the court found guilt under 720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(2)), and possession of a stolen or converted motor vehicle; he was sentenced to 16 years (home invasion) and 3 years concurrent (vehicle).
- On appeal Brand challenged Facebook-message authentication, sufficiency of evidence for possession of a stolen/converted vehicle, chain of custody for the keys, denial of a Krankel hearing on ineffective-assistance claims, alleged improper sentencing considerations, the order of protection, and the mittimus entry.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authentication of Facebook messages | Messages were admissible: Shannon knew the sender as "Masetti Meech," a name Brand used; messages contained unique, nonpublic details linking them to Brand | Messages were not properly authenticated; no direct proof Brand authored the messages | Admitted; court found sufficient circumstantial authentication (sender name history + unique details about car location and family/work addresses) |
| Sufficiency for possession of stolen/converted vehicle | Indictment charged possession of a vehicle "stolen or converted"; State need only prove knowing possession of a stolen or converted vehicle | Argues State failed to prove intent to permanently deprive (theft) | Affirmed: conviction sustained under the indictment charging stolen or converted vehicle; proof supported conversion (wrongful deprivation) |
| Admission of photos of keys (chain of custody) | Officer testimony about routine custodial search and inventory sufficed to admit photos | Chain of custody incomplete—no testimony identifying who seized/inventoried/safeguarded keys | Admission was error (insufficient chain), but harmless because Shannon’s credible testimony independently supported conviction |
| Krankel (posttrial pro se ineffective-assistance) | Trial court said defendant could file pro se motion and it would set a Krankel hearing | Defendant asserts trial court never conducted the required Krankel inquiry/hearing | Remanded for a preliminary Krankel hearing; State concedes hearing required |
| Sentencing consideration of "other matters" | Court relied on defendant’s criminal history and the State’s aggravation argument about prior convictions | Defendant claims unspecified "other matters" improperly influenced sentence and seeks resentencing | No reversible error; defendant forfeited contemporaneous objection and court’s reference plainly meant prior convictions, a proper aggravator |
| Order of protection statutory requirements | Court made findings based on trial evidence and defendant’s record; order tailored to protect victim | Argues court failed to make the statutorily required written/oral findings and thus order should be vacated | No reversible error; court’s oral findings at sentencing show consideration of statutory factors and necessity for protection |
| Mittimus incorrect home-invasion subsection | State did not oppose correcting clerical error | Mittimus mistakenly identified (a)(3) (armed) rather than (a)(2) (intentional injury) | Mittimus corrected to reflect conviction under 720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(2) |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.2d 181 (Ill. 1984) (trial court duty to inquire into posttrial pro se claims of ineffective assistance)
- United States v. Vayner, 769 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014) (social-media authentication depends on context; multiple methods may suffice)
- Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (survey of electronic-communications authentication factors)
- People v. Mullins, 242 Ill.2d 1 (Ill. 2011) (harmless-error doctrine where conviction would stand absent the error)
- People v. Davison, 233 Ill.2d 30 (Ill. 2009) (sufficiency-of-evidence standard—review in light most favorable to the State)
- People v. Whirl, 351 Ill. App.3d 464 (Ill. App. Ct.) (chain-of-custody requirements for admission of physical evidence)
- People v. Heider, 231 Ill.2d 1 (Ill. 2008) (forfeiture exception where trial court had opportunity to rule on claim later raised on appeal)
- People v. Chapman, 194 Ill.2d 186 (Ill. 2000) (when Krankel inquiry warrants appointment of new counsel to evaluate claim)