People v. Branch
2017 IL App (5th) 130220
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- Defendant James R. Branch was convicted by a jury of three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and sentenced to three consecutive 15‑year terms. The alleged conduct occurred between May 2010 and May 2011; victim L.M.D. was 7–8 years old.
- Counts charged: cunnilingus, digital penetration (placing a finger in the victim’s vagina), and forcing the victim to perform fellatio. No physical/forensic corroboration was introduced at trial.
- The victim disclosed abuse after being placed in a foster home; forensic interviews and DCFS investigators found her statements credible. Defendant denied the assaults, but admitted interacting with and buying things for the child.
- A recorded police interview existed; defendant signed Miranda warnings and initially waived rights, but at points stated he wanted an attorney; he later reinitiated talk and made a spontaneous statement when told he was under arrest.
- Posttrial, defendant raised prosecutorial‑misconduct and ineffective‑assistance claims and moved to suppress post‑invocation statements. At sentencing he allegedly made an allocution alleging ineffective assistance, but the court made no on‑the‑record inquiry (Krankel issue).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People/State) | Defendant's Argument (Branch) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for digital penetration (predatory sexual assault vs. aggravated criminal sexual abuse) | Victim’s testimony that defendant rubbed her vagina with his hand permitted a reasonable inference of penetration. | There was no proof of digital penetration; evidence supports only lesser offense. | Conviction for predatory criminal sexual assault upheld; testimony allowed an inference of intrusion. |
| Prosecutorial misconduct / fairness of trial | Prosecutor’s questioning and closing were within permissible bounds and drew reasonable inferences from the evidence. | Prosecutor misled jury, suggested unsupported facts, improperly bolstered victim; trial counsel failed to object or preserve issues. | No reversible prosecutorial misconduct found; overall trial was fair. |
| Suppression of postarrest statement / Miranda/Edwards invocation | Defendant reinitiated conversation after invoking counsel; later spontaneous statement on being told he was under arrest was unsolicited and admissible. | Statement should be suppressed because defendant had invoked his right to counsel; subsequent statements were product of custodial interrogation without counsel. | Trial court did not err: defendant initiated further discussion after invocation and the later remark was a spontaneous, unsolicited statement admissible at trial. |
| Krankel preliminary inquiry into pro se ineffective‑assistance claims at sentencing | No need for remand where claims lack merit. | Court failed to conduct any Krankel inquiry after defendant raised pro se claims at allocution; record insufficient—remand required. | Remand ordered for a limited Krankel inquiry (to determine whether new counsel should be appointed); trial court erred by making no inquiry. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.2d 181 (establishes duty to inquire into pro se claims of ineffective assistance)
- People v. Moore, 207 Ill.2d 68 (clarifies scope of preliminary Krankel inquiry and when appointment of new counsel is required)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (custodial‑interrogation warning and voluntariness principles)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (post‑invocation interrogation rule: police may not reinitiate without counsel unless defendant initiates)
- People v. Hillier, 392 Ill. App.3d 66 (trier of fact may infer penetration from victim’s testimony)
- People v. Woolley, 178 Ill.2d 175 (statements admissible when defendant initiates communication after invoking counsel)