People v. Brakes
186 N.E.3d 1066
Ill. App. Ct.2021Background
- Defendant Tarik Brakes (a juvenile at the time) was charged in three indictments: armed robbery of Reginald Williams and Steve Martin, attempted armed robbery of Demacio and Demario Bailey, and first-degree murder for Demario’s death; three codefendants were separately charged.
- Witnesses (Williams, Martin, Penn, others) identified Tarik as the gunman; Penn testified Tarik shot Demario. A single .380 semiautomatic shell casing was recovered; no gun was recovered.
- The State introduced a Facebook photo taken ~2 months before the crimes showing Tarik holding a gun next to codefendant Carlos Johnson, who appeared to make a hand sign; the trial court admitted the photo over a motion in limine.
- Jury convicted Tarik of murder, attempted armed robbery, and two armed robberies. Sentence: 33 years for murder (served at 100%) consecutive to 6-year attempted armed robbery (50% credit applicable) and concurrent 6-year robbery counts — aggregate term 45 years.
- On appeal Tarik argued (1) the Facebook photo was irrelevant/prejudicial (and a backdoor for gang evidence) and (2) his 45-year aggregate sentence was a de facto life sentence (violating Miller and Buffer) and that the 100% truth-in-sentencing statute as applied was unconstitutional; he also challenged the sufficiency of the trial court’s juvenile-sentencing findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Facebook photo (relevance/ gang inference) | Photo showed relationship between Tarik and Johnson and corroborated identification; relevant to case | Photo was unrelated to charged offenses, gun in photo not tied to the crime, and photo invited prejudicial gang inference | Photo was irrelevant and admission was error, but error harmless |
| Harmlessness of photo error | Photo aided identification/impugned defendant’s character | Photo was minimally used (single witness), never emphasized, and other testimony linked Tarik to the gun | Error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; did not contribute to conviction |
| De facto life sentence / good-conduct credit (Buffer/Dorsey) | State: Tarik not intended to receive life; good-conduct credit reduces actual time below 40 years | Tarik: 45-year term is de facto life per Buffer; good-conduct credit should not be considered | Under Illinois Supreme Court in Dorsey, opportunity for release (including via good-conduct credit) matters; Tarik’s effective maximum incarceration is 39 years, so not a de facto life sentence; sentence affirmed |
| As-applied challenge to 100% murder statute / Miller proportionality | Statute forcing 100% service denies juvenile chance to demonstrate rehabilitation before 40 years; unconstitutional as applied | Statute permissible because under Dorsey defendant has prospect of release before 40 years via credits; challenge targets sentence not statute | Rejected: Dorsey controls—statute not unconstitutional as applied because defendant can be released before surpassing 40 years; proportionate-penalties and other challenges fail as presented |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010 (Illinois Supreme Court) (juvenile-sentencing analysis focuses on actual opportunity for release before 40 years)
- People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 (Illinois Supreme Court) (established 40-year ceiling for de facto life on juvenile offenders)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life-without-parole for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment)
- People v. Peacock, 2019 IL App (1st) 170308 (appellate precedent declining to factor good-conduct credit into de facto life calculation)
- People v. Manuel, 294 Ill. App. 3d 113 (1997) (prior relationship evidence admissible when it explains otherwise inexplicable behavior)
- People v. Hensley, 2014 IL App (1st) 120802 (uncharged-crime evidence showing use/brandishing of same-caliber gun admissible when probative)
- People v. Pacheco, 2013 IL App (4th) 110409 (truth-in-sentencing statute does not by itself render an otherwise lawful term unconstitutional)
