People v. Boyd
2017 CO 2
| Colo. | 2017Background
- Pamela Boyd was convicted (jury verdict Aug 8, 2012; sentence Nov 14, 2012) for attempt to distribute and possession of marijuana; the total seized was less than one ounce.
- Amendment 64 (Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16), legalizing possession of one ounce or less, became effective Dec 10, 2012; Boyd filed a timely notice of appeal on Dec 21, 2012.
- The question: whether Amendment 64 deprived the State of authority to continue prosecuting nonfinal convictions for possession of ≤1 ounce when a right to appeal was pending as of the Amendment’s effective date.
- The majority held Amendment 64 superseded the relevant statute criminalizing possession ≤1 ounce, so the State lacked authority to continue prosecuting on appeal and vacated the possession conviction.
- The court relied principally on United States v. Chambers (repeal of Prohibition), treating a constitutional change that renders prior criminalization inoperative as barring continued prosecutions, including on appeal.
- A three-justice dissent argued the Amendment was prospective, pointed to the Amendment’s effective-date language, and contended voters did not clearly intend retroactive relief; the dissent would affirm the State’s continued prosecutorial authority for acts illegal when committed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Amendment 64 deprived the State of authority to continue prosecuting nonfinal convictions for possession ≤1 oz when a right to appeal was pending at the Amendment’s effective date | Boyd: Amendment 64 legalized the conduct while her right to appeal was pending, so possession conviction must be vacated | State: Amendment 64 took effect Dec 10, 2012 and was prospective; it does not retroactively strip the State’s authority to prosecute criminal acts committed before that date | Held for Boyd: Amendment 64 superseded the statutory prohibition and, upon its effective date, deprived the State of authority to continue prosecution on appeal |
| Whether Chambers (repeal precedent) controls the effect of a later constitutional change on pending prosecutions | Boyd: Chambers supports that repeal/inoperative changes bar continued prosecutions, including appeals | State: Chambers differs because Amendment 64 set an effective date and did not clearly intend retroactivity | Held: Chambers controlling; when a law is rendered inoperative by an amendment, pending prosecutions cannot continue |
| Whether the Amendment’s "notwithstanding" and effective-date language preserves prosecutions for pre-effective-date conduct | Boyd: statutory criminalization was superseded regardless of when conduct occurred if conviction was nonfinal with appeal pending | State: Effective-date language shows voters intended prospective application; conduct illegal before the date remains prosecutable | Held: Majority rejects prospective-only reading for nonfinal convictions on appeal; dissent would have held otherwise |
| Scope of remedy (nonfinal convictions only vs. final convictions) | Boyd: relief applies to nonfinal convictions with pending right to appeal at effective date | State: argued Amendment shouldn’t reach pre-effective final convictions | Held: Court limited ruling to nonfinal convictions with pending appeal rights at the effective date; did not decide effect on final convictions |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934) (when a constitutional change renders a statute inoperative, pending prosecutions under that statute, including appeals, cannot continue)
- Danielson v. Dennis, 139 P.3d 688 (Colo. 2006) (constitutional amendment interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Jackson v. State, 966 P.2d 1046 (Colo. 1998) (use of future-oriented wording in amendments supports prospective application)
- Bruce v. City of Colo. Springs, 129 P.3d 988 (Colo. 2006) (interpretation of voter intent for constitutional measures)