People v. Boyce
59 Cal. 4th 672
| Cal. | 2014Background
- On Aug. 14, 1997, Kevin Boyce and co-defendant Andre Willis committed armed burglaries/robberies at a hair salon and later at a pizzeria; Deputy Shayne York (off‑duty) was shot once at the salon and died. Boyce was convicted of first‑degree murder (including special circumstances: killing a peace officer in retaliation and felony‑murder during robbery/burglary), multiple robberies/attempted robberies and burglaries, and found to have personally used a firearm. He was sentenced to death and a concurrent determinate term (stayed).
- Physical evidence (firearm, shell casing, fingerprints on murder weapon, ATM card use, property in the car) and witness identifications tied Boyce to the crimes; a covert recorded jailhouse conversation and Boyce’s recorded statements were admitted and considered.
- Defense presented challenges to confession reliability and offered mitigation evidence of low IQ, learning disabilities, brain injury, substance abuse, and mental illness; experts testified but did not conclude complete incapacity to distinguish right/wrong.
- At penalty, defense sought self‑representation and to limit counsel’s participation; the trial court denied pro se status as untimely and because Boyce repeatedly said he did not want to represent himself. Counsel then presented mitigation and jurors deliberated penalty.
- On appeal, the Supreme Court of California affirmed convictions and death sentence on all major guilt/penalty issues but found a Cunningham Sixth‑Amendment error in imposing upper terms on one determinate count (victim vulnerability used by judge without jury finding); the determinate term was conditionally modified and remand for resentencing was preserved to the People.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Boyce) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of 911 tapes (guilt/penalty) | Tapes are contemporaneous, relevant to crime scene, credibility, and victim impact; admissible. | Tapes are irrelevant, unduly prejudicial, violate due process. | Admitted: probative for credibility/crime circumstances and penalty impact; not unduly prejudicial. |
| Flight instruction (CALJIC No. 2.52) | Evidence of immediate departure, hiding weapons/property supports flight inference; instruction proper. | Insufficient evidence of flight; instruction improper and unconstitutional/permissive. | Instruction proper; facts supported inference of flight; standard wording upheld. |
| Peace‑officer special circumstance (§190.2(a)(7)) — sufficiency & vagueness | Evidence (comments about badge, racial epithets, admission of motive, gang membership) shows intentional killing in retaliation for officer duties; statute clear. | Statute requires proof defendant targeted officer for specific official acts; otherwise vague and overbroad. | Substantial evidence supports retaliation finding; statute not unconstitutionally vague or requiring link to specific acts. |
| Felony‑murder special circumstances (robbery/burglary) — sufficiency & jury instruction | Killing occurred during burglary/robbery as part of a continuous transaction and defendant had independent felonious purpose; CALJIC instruction correct. | Killing was retaliatory/status killing, felonies incidental to murder; instruction and findings improper. | Substantial evidence supports felony‑murder special circumstances; CALJIC 8.81.17 correctly stated Green rule and court’s supplemental reply was proper (defense forfeited any complaint). |
| Faretta / self‑representation at penalty phase | Boyce did not unequivocally demand to proceed pro se; request untimely and inconsistent; court properly denied. | Boyce sought removal of counsel and effective control of penalty phase; denial violated Faretta. | No Sixth Amendment violation: Boyce repeatedly said he did not want to represent himself; motion was equivocal/untimely and court acted within discretion. |
| Determinate sentencing — judge‑found aggravating facts (Cunningham) | Upper term chosen properly based on aggravation and/or prior convictions and probation report. | Imposition of upper term for victim vulnerability was based on judge‑found fact not found by jury — Cunningham error requiring relief. | Cunningham error: judge imposed upper term on count 2 and enhancement based on victim vulnerability (no jury finding). Remedial conditional modification to lower terms was ordered, with remand option preserved to People. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Streeter, 54 Cal.4th 205 (Cal. 2012) (standard for reviewing trial court evidentiary discretion)
- People v. Osband, 13 Cal.4th 622 (Cal. 1996) (admission of circumstances attending violent crimes)
- People v. Roybal, 19 Cal.4th 481 (Cal. 1998) (admission of spontaneous 911 statements relevant to crime scene/credibility)
- People v. Gurule, 28 Cal.4th 557 (Cal. 2002) (victim‑impact and gruesome evidence balancing probative/prejudicial value)
- People v. Hawthorne, 46 Cal.4th 67 (Cal. 2009) (911 recordings admissible as penalty‑phase victim impact)
- People v. Green, 27 Cal.3d 1 (Cal. 1980) (felony‑murder special circumstance not supported when felony is merely incidental to murder)
- Coffman & Marlow v. People, 34 Cal.4th 1 (Cal. 2004) (continuous‑transaction test for felony‑murder special circumstance)
- People v. Jenkins, 22 Cal.4th 900 (Cal. 2000) (peace‑officer murder special circumstance requires accused’s subjective intent)
- Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (U.S. 2007) (judge‑found facts cannot expose defendant to greater upper term beyond statutory maximum; jury right under Sixth Amendment)
- Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (U.S. 2002) (categorical Eighth Amendment bar to executing intellectually disabled)
- Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986 (U.S. 2014) (standards for assessing intellectual disability and rejection of rigid IQ cutoff)
