2021 IL App (4th) 200509
Ill. App. Ct.2021Background:
- In 1990 Laura Bowers pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
- In 2015 the Illinois legislature added 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(b-5), allowing incarcerated survivors of domestic violence to seek resentencing by presenting evidence that the crime was related to prior abuse.
- In December 2017 Bowers filed a pro se 2-1401(b-5) petition attaching an affidavit alleging spousal abuse by the victim.
- The State moved to dismiss, arguing the petition was barred by the two‑year statute of limitations in 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c).
- The trial court granted the State’s motion in September 2020, concluding the two-year limitations period applied and Bowers’s petition was untimely; Bowers appealed.
- The Fourth District affirmed, holding the plain language of §2-1401(c) imposes a two‑year bar that applied to Bowers’s petition.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the two‑year statute of limitations in 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(c) bars a §2-1401(b-5) petition filed by a defendant sentenced long before enactment | The State: §2-1401(c) plainly requires filing within two years of the judgment; b-5 is not listed as an exception, so the petition is untimely | Bowers: The structure and remedial purpose of b-5 (and its diligence requirement) show the legislature intended backward‑looking relief beyond two years; applying §2-1401(c) yields an absurd, inequitable result | The court: §2-1401(c)’s plain two‑year limitation applies; applying it is not absurd; petition is untimely; judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. McChriston, 4 N.E.3d 29 (Ill. 2014) (use plain statutory language to determine legislative intent)
- People v. Witherspoon, 129 N.E.3d 1208 (Ill. 2019) (apply clear statutory language as written)
- People v. Eppinger, 984 N.E.2d 475 (Ill. 2013) (courts may not read into statutes exceptions the legislature did not express)
- People v. Revell, 372 Ill. App. 3d 981 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (courts may depart from literal language only to avoid truly absurd results)
