People v. Bona
118 N.E.3d 1272
Ill. App. Ct.2018Background
- In March 2013 Stephen Bona left two voicemails for State Representative Jeanne Ives; the second (preserved) message referenced Sarah Palin’s map showing Democrats in gun cross-hairs and said, “Perhaps we should do the same for you. We know where you live. There is no longer an assault weapons ban…you stupid fucking bitch.”
- Office staff reported the second voicemail to police; Ives testified she felt frightened and threatened for her and her children.
- Bona admitted leaving the messages, said he had prepared a written statement criticizing Ives’s views on gay marriage and gun rights, denied intent to threaten, and claimed some content was misremembered or deleted.
- A jury convicted Bona of two counts of threatening a public official under 720 ILCS 5/12-9(a); he was sentenced to two years’ probation and appealed.
- On appeal Bona challenged the statute's constitutionality under the First Amendment and Illinois Constitution, sufficiency of the evidence (intent), admissibility of Ives’s testimony about her fear, and certain prosecutor remarks during closing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality of 720 ILCS 5/12-9 under First Amendment | Statute is constitutional because, properly instructed, it reaches only unprotected “true threats.” | Statute is content-based, overbroad, not limited to true threats or speech integral to criminal conduct, thus unconstitutional. | Statute constitutional: "threat" must be a true threat (intent to threaten or knowledge it will be viewed as threat); statute’s mental state (“knowingly”) suffices and was applied constitutionally. |
| Sufficiency of evidence on intent to threaten | Evidence (message content, reference to Palin map, “we,” mention of Giffords shooting, differing explanations to police) supports inference Bona intended threat. | Bona’s uncontradicted testimony said his purpose was political criticism; message ambiguous and comparable to non-threatening cases. | Evidence sufficient: jury reasonably found Bona intended to issue a true threat. |
| Admissibility of victim’s testimony about her fear | Ives’s reaction is probative of the element “reasonable apprehension of harm.” | Her subjective fear is irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. | Admissible: her response was relevant to an element; probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. |
| Prosecutor’s closing-argument remarks | Prosecutor’s comments were proper argument on evidence and reasonable inferences; any inaccuracies were corrected or cured. | Several remarks misstated law/evidence, invited passion, or improperly told jury not to consider certain evidence. | No reversible error: remarks viewed in context were within permissible bounds or cured by the court; forfeited issues reviewed for plain error not shown. |
Key Cases Cited
- Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (true-threat doctrine distinguishes political hyperbole from unprotected threats)
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (statute banning cross-burning unconstitutional where prima facie intent provision removed true-threat requirement)
- Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (criminal statutes punishing threats require at least intent to threaten or knowledge that statement will be viewed as a threat)
- Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (knowledge of the character and nature of material as noninnocent informs mens rea analysis for speech-related offenses)