People v. Bloom, S095223

Background:

In 1982 Robert Bloom was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for killing his father (first-degree) and his stepmother and stepsister (initially first-degree; later retried convictions became second-degree); federal habeas relief was granted in 1997 based on ineffective assistance in presenting mental-health evidence, leading to a 2000 retrial.
At retrial Bloom pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity; defense counsel conceded Bloom killed all three victims to pursue a mental-capacity defense, but Bloom expressly accepted responsibility only for his father’s killing and objected to conceding the others.
The retrial jury convicted Bloom of first-degree murder of his father (with firearm finding), and second-degree murder of the stepmother and stepsister (with weapon/firearm findings) and found true a multiple-murder special circumstance; Bloom was later sentenced to death.
Multiple defense mental-health experts testified about brain injury, Asperger spectrum traits, dissociation, and personality disorder; prosecution presented eyewitnesses and prior statements corroborating planning and execution of the killings.
The Supreme Court of California held defense counsel’s concession of guilt for the two counts Bloom had expressly refused to admit (Josephine and Sandra) violated Bloom’s Sixth Amendment autonomy right under McCoy; the court affirmed the conviction as to the father’s murder but reversed the convictions, associated enhancements, special circumstance, and the death judgment tied to the other two killings.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Constitutionality of retrial given passage of time and loss of original experts	State: retrial permitted; delay attributable to appeals and habeas review, not undue prosecution delay	Bloom: loss of original experts deprived him of meaningful opportunity to present mental-defect defense; court should dismiss or limit charges	Held: No due process violation; retrial allowed and extreme remedies not required because new experts testified and delay was from appellate process
Competency proceedings (Pen. Code §1368)	State: court did not abuse discretion; contemporaneous experts found Bloom competent	Bloom: cumulative behavior and expert declarations required competency hearing at guilt and sanity phases	Held: No substantial-evidence-based doubt requiring suspension during guilt or sanity phases; court did not err
Sixth Amendment autonomy / counsel concession (McCoy issue)	State: counsel’s concessions were strategic and within counsel’s authority	Bloom: defense counsel conceded guilt for two murders over his explicit objection, violating McCoy right to decide fundamental objectives (to maintain innocence)	Held: McCoy error as to counts 2 and 3 (Josephine and Sandra). Reversed those convictions, related enhancements, multiple-murder special circumstance, and death sentence; conviction for father’s murder and firearm finding affirmed
Admission of prior testimony (Evid. Code §1291)	State: prior testimony admissible; defendant had opportunity to cross-examine earlier witnesses	Bloom: prior counsel ineffective and retrospective incompetence undermined adequacy of earlier cross-examination; exclude Medrano and Waller testimony	Held: Admission was proper; prior cross-examination provided adequate opportunity and retrospective competency claim did not require exclusion
Cross-exam re: expert referencing defendant courtroom demeanor	State: prosecutor could test expert bases when defense put mental condition in issue	Bloom: questions about courtroom interactions were irrelevant and risked invading attorney-client privilege	Held: Proper—defense put behavior in issue; cross-exam probed bases of expert opinions and did not expose privileged communications
Prosecutorial misconduct and Griffin issues	State: arguments and questions were grounded in record and fair inferences	Bloom: prosecutor vouched, commented on silence, and used improper facts not in evidence	Held: No reversible misconduct; a brief Griffin-type comment was harmless beyond reasonable doubt
Faretta / right to self-representation in sanity phase	State: court permissibly denied untimely Faretta request due to complexity and likely delay	Bloom: court should have allowed him to represent himself during sanity phase	Held: Denial was within court’s discretion (request untimely; reasonable concerns about disruption)
Defendant absenting himself from sanity phase (Pen. Code §§977,1043)	State: defendant voluntarily waived presence; counsel represented him	Bloom: state law required presence for capital defendant; waiver was not adequately informed	Held: Under state law allowing presence was error, but harmless beyond reasonable probability; constitutional waiver was voluntary and knowing

Key Cases Cited

McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) (defendant’s autonomy to insist on maintaining innocence is a client decision; counsel may not concede guilt over client’s explicit objection)
Bloom v. Calderon, 132 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997) (habeas relief based on ineffective assistance for failure to adequately investigate/present mental-health evidence)
People v. Bloom, 48 Cal.3d 1194 (Cal. 1989) (prior appeal addressing earlier proceedings in the case)
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (speedy trial balancing test; delay from appellate review not per se unconstitutional)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (harmless-error standard for federal constitutional error)
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (right to self-representation; courts may require timely assertion of the right)
People v. McDowell, 54 Cal.4th 395 (Cal. 2012) (retrial after reversal may proceed in normal course; delay from review generally not a speedy-trial violation)
People v. Wycoff, 12 Cal.5th 58 (Cal. 2021) (contemporaneous expert opinions of incompetence can compel competency hearing)
People v. Ledesma, 39 Cal.4th 641 (Cal. 2006) (use of prior testimony after reversal analyzed in light of former counsel’s effectiveness and opportunity to cross-examine)