People v. Blackwell
2016 COA 136
| Colo. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Defendant Aaron Michael Blackwell pleaded guilty to theft from an at‑risk victim; the court granted a deferred judgment conditioned on obeying federal, state, and local criminal laws.
- In a later, separate case Blackwell pleaded guilty to driving after revocation prohibited (DARP), a Colorado class 1 misdemeanor, and the court again deferred judgment.
- The prosecution moved to revoke the deferred judgment in the theft case alleging the DARP plea/conviction violated the theft deferred‑judgment condition.
- At the revocation hearing the court treated Blackwell’s guilty plea in the DARP deferred judgment as a conviction and found a violation of the theft deferred judgment condition.
- The district court revoked the deferred judgment in the theft case; Blackwell appealed, arguing his DARP plea under a deferred judgment did not constitute a “conviction” for purposes of the revocation‑hearing statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a guilty plea resulting in a deferred judgment in a later case constitutes a "conviction" under § 16‑11‑206(3) so as to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt at a revocation hearing | The DARP guilty plea was accepted by the court and thus is a conviction under the statute; it satisfies the revocation standard | A guilty plea that results in a deferred judgment is not a conviction and therefore cannot serve as a criminal conviction to revoke an earlier deferred judgment | Guilty plea accepted in deferred judgment proceedings constitutes a "conviction" for § 16‑11‑206(3) purposes; revocation affirmed |
| Whether the court erred by not requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Blackwell committed DARP | Acceptance of the guilty plea operates as a conviction, so the higher proof standard is unnecessary | The court should have required proof beyond a reasonable doubt rather than rely on the later deferred‑judgment plea | No error; acceptance of the plea amounted to a conviction, so the revocation hearing standard did not require additional proof beyond the plea |
Key Cases Cited
- Hafelfinger v. District Court, 674 P.2d 375 (Colo. 1984) (plea accepted with deferred sentence constitutes a conviction for collateral‑purpose determinations)
- People v. Ickler, 877 P.2d 863 (Colo. App.) (standard of review: revocation of probation/deferred judgment reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- People v. Widhalm, 642 P.2d 498 (Colo. 1982) (distinguishes between "conviction" upon plea acceptance and a later "judgment of conviction" following revocation)