People v. Bingham, 73 N.E.3d 39

Jerome Bingham was convicted after a bench trial of stealing six pallets from a Kmart in May 2014; value < $500. The State introduced surveillance video and identification by a store security guard. Bingham testified he believed he had permission to take broken pallets.
The indictment expressly alleged a prior retail-theft conviction, which elevated the theft from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 4 felony under 720 ILCS 5/16-1(b)(2).
At sentencing the court imposed 3 years’ imprisonment (the top of the Class 4 range) and $699 in fines, fees, and costs. The PSI showed a 1983 attempted criminal sexual assault conviction and multiple later offenses.
Under the Sex Offender Registration Act as amended in 2011 (730 ILCS 150/3(c)(2.1)), Bingham’s 2014 felony required him to register as a sex offender for the 1983 conviction, even though that offense predated the Act.
On appeal Bingham challenged: (1) the Act’s constitutionality as applied to him (due process), (2) an ex post facto violation, (3) elevation to and sentencing as a Class 4 felony, and (4) several fines/fees (including DNA analysis fee and presentence incarceration credit).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (Bingham)	Held
1. As‑applied substantive due process challenge to Sex Offender Registration Act	The Act is rationally related to public safety; record supports registration here	Act unreasonable as applied: Bingham’s recent offense nonsexual, remote 1983 sex offense, no present risk	Affirmed: rational‑basis met — recidivism and recent felony support registration.
2. Ex post facto challenge to retroactive registration requirement	Registration is civil/regulatory, not punitive	Retroactive imposition of registration is punitive and thus forbidden	Rejected: binding precedent treats registration as nonpunitive; no ex post facto violation.
3. Sufficiency of indictment / improper elevation and enhanced sentence	Indictment explicitly alleged prior retail theft; defendant had notice of Class 4 status	Indictment didn’t state State’s intent to seek enhanced sentence under 725 ILCS 5/111-3(c) so elevation and 3‑yr sentence improper	Rejected: defendant had adequate pretrial notice that prior conviction elevated theft to Class 4; sentence valid.
4. Fines and fees (DNA fee; $5/day presentence credit applied)	DNA fee improper if defendant already in DNA database; presentence credit applies to certain fines	DNA fee should be vacated; presentence credit should reduce fines	Modified: vacated $250 DNA analysis fee; applied $65 total presentence credit to specified fines; $190 filing fee is a fee (not a fine) so credit not applied.

Malchow v. Illinois, 193 Ill. 2d 413 (Supreme Court of Illinois) (sex‑offender registration and notification laws considered nonpunitive)
In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50 (Supreme Court of Illinois) (rational‑basis review for nonfundamental right; registration statute analyzed under rational basis)
People v. Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d 573 (Supreme Court of Illinois) (framework for reviewing due‑process challenges to registration laws)
People v. Mosley, 2015 IL 115872 (Supreme Court of Illinois) (requirement of evidentiary hearing/findings for as‑applied challenge when record insufficient)
People ex rel. Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185 (Supreme Court of Illinois) (sex‑offender registration is not punishment)
People v. Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d 285 (Supreme Court of Illinois) (DNA analysis fee vacated when defendant already in DNA database)
People v. Tolliver, 363 Ill. App. 3d 94 (Appellate Court of Illinois) (filing‑of‑felony‑complaint charge is a fee, not a fine)
People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282 (Supreme Court of Illinois) (notice requirement of section 111-3 for enhanced charges)
People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539 (Supreme Court of Illinois) (procedural forfeiture principles for sentencing objections)
People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381 (Supreme Court of Illinois) (earlier treatment of registration scheme as nonpunitive)