People v. Bingham
2014 IL 115964
| Ill. | 2014Background
- Julianna Bingham (19) was adjudicated a sexually dangerous person (SDPA) after incidents including: attempted kissing/pressing lips and tongue on teacher Ashley Guntol and attempting to grab her breast; a single buttock grab of 17‑year‑old Katie C. at a group home; and past juvenile findings for fondling peers.
- Two court‑appointed psychiatrists (Drs. Jeckel and Killian) diagnosed personality disorders and opined Bingham had criminal propensities to commit sex offenses and was likely to reoffend if not confined.
- The trial court ordered commitment and appointed the IDOC Director as guardian.
- The appellate court reversed, finding the State failed to prove (1) criminal propensities to commit sex offenses and (2) demonstrated propensities toward sexual assault or molestation of children; it also noted the trial court did not make the explicit “substantially probable” finding required by Masterson.
- The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, holding experts’ opinions plus the single incident (Guntol) were insufficient to satisfy the statutory elements; the lack of Masterson’s explicit finding was error but not dispositive given insufficient evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Bingham) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court had to make an explicit finding that it is "substantially probable" Bingham will commit future sex offenses if not confined | Masterson’s requirement was satisfied by Dr. Killian’s testimony that respondent was "substantially likely" to reoffend; presumption the court follows the law | Masterson requires an explicit judicial finding | Court: Masterson requires an explicit finding; trial court erred by not making it, but reversal rests on insufficiency of evidence, so error is harmless here |
| Whether State proved Bingham has "criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses" (SDPA element) | Expert testimony diagnosing disorders and opining substantial likelihood to reoffend sufficed; underlying criminal charge need not be sexual | Experts’ opinions without adequate proof of past sex offenses are insufficient | Court: Experts’ opinions alone (and unsubstantiated parent‑reported incidents) are insufficient; evidence showed only one qualifying sex offense (Guntol), which is insufficient to prove substantial probability of future sex offenses |
| Whether State proved "demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or sexual molestation of children" (SDPA element) | Single incidents (including Katie C. at 17) and other reported conduct satisfy the "demonstrated" requirement; statute requires at least one act or attempt | The incidents do not establish sexual assault or child molestation (Katie C. incident ambiguous/possibly accidental); Guntol was an adult | Court: No evidence of sexual penetration (so not sexual assault) and insufficient evidence that the Katie C. touching was sexual molestation of a child; State failed to prove this element |
| Proper definitional guide for "sex offenses" and "sexual molestation" under SDPA | SDPA terms should not be narrowly confined; State proposed broader dictionary‑based meaning | Court may look to Criminal Code and related statutes/regulations for consistent definitions | Court: It is appropriate to consult Criminal Code and relevant administrative rules; "sexual conduct" per Criminal Code (touching breasts/sex organs/anus for arousal) and Dept. of Children & Family Services definition control interpretation here |
Key Cases Cited
- Masterson v. People, 207 Ill. 2d 305 (2003) (requires explicit judicial finding that it is “substantially probable” the respondent will commit sex offenses in the future if not confined)
- Allen v. People, 107 Ill. 2d 91 (1985) (SDPA requires proof of at least one act or attempt of sexual assault or sexual molestation; demonstrated propensity, not mere speculation)
- Lovett v. People, 234 Ill. App. 3d 645 (1992) (SDPA’s petition requirement does not require the underlying criminal charge to be a sexual offense)
- Bailey v. People, 405 Ill. App. 3d 154 (2010) (standard of review: consider evidence in light most favorable to State; reversal if no rational trier of fact could find elements beyond a reasonable doubt)