People v. Bates, 222 Cal. App. 4th 60

Deputies responded to a reported cell-phone theft; victim described a black male, slightly older than high‑school age, wearing all blue, possibly named “Marcus,” who drove a gold van.
Deputies learned Bates was a felony probationer with a warrantless search condition and surveilled his apartment complex for a gold van.
About two hours after the theft, a deputy saw a man matching the general description walking from the complex toward an adjacent mobile home park.
Shortly thereafter Deputy Gidding stopped a tan car leaving the park (he later said he “stopped the car”) after observing occupants; the back‑seat passenger identified himself as Marcus Bates and was wearing blue clothing.
Bates moved to suppress evidence from the stop; the trial court denied the motion, concluding the probation search condition justified detention/search or that the stop was an investigatory detention.
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the initial stop was a Fourth Amendment seizure without reasonable suspicion and that Bates’s probation search condition did not attenuate the taint.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was stopping the tan car a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment?	The stop was voluntary and not a show of authority.	The deputy’s presence, uniform, patrol car, and gesture constituted a show of authority; reasonable person would not feel free to leave.	Stop was a seizure: deputy’s conduct amounted to a show of authority.
Was there reasonable, particularized suspicion to justify the investigatory stop?	Information about the theft, victim description, sighting near the complex, and timing justified the stop.	Deputy lacked specific, articulable facts tying the tan car or its occupants to the crime; stop was based on a hunch.	No reasonable suspicion; detention was unlawful.
Could discovery of Bates’s probation search condition after the stop attenuate the Fourth Amendment taint?	The probation search condition retroactively justified/attenuated the unlawful stop (relying on Durant).	Post‑hoc knowledge of probation status cannot retroactively cure a suspicionless seizure when officers lacked that knowledge at the time of the stop.	Probation search condition did not attenuate the taint; allowing it would invite random stops.
Was police conduct sufficiently purposeful/flagrant to require exclusion?	The stop was in good faith (investigative).	The stop was a suspicionless, purposeful seizure made in hope something would turn up, implicating deterrence.	Conduct was purposeful for attenuation analysis; exclusion required.

Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (U.S. 2007) (passenger is "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes and may challenge a traffic stop)
People v. Brendlin, 45 Cal.4th 262 (Cal. 2008) (three‑factor attenuation test to determine whether evidence is tainted by an unlawful stop)
People v. Souza, 9 Cal.4th 224 (Cal. 1994) (reasonable suspicion requires particularized facts; late‑night, high‑crime, suspicious behavior supported detention there)
People v. Hernandez, 45 Cal.4th 295 (Cal. 2008) (standards for reviewing suppression rulings and limits on investigative detentions)
People v. Durant, 205 Cal.App.4th 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (held a probation search condition can attenuate taint — distinguished and not followed here)
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (U.S. 1975) (attenuation doctrine factors and rationale tied to deterrence of police misconduct)