People v. Barnes
89 N.E.3d 969
Ill. App. Ct.2018Background
- On July 9, 2009 Tyrone Barnes exchanged gunfire on a Harvey street with an unidentified man; an errant bullet from the unidentified man killed innocent bystander Simeon Sanders.
- Barnes was tried for felony murder (predicated on aggravated discharge) and for armed violence predicated on mob action; jury acquitted him of felony murder but convicted him of armed violence and sentenced to 24 years.
- The State’s theory: Barnes and the other shooter were "acting together" by participating in a mutual "gunfight" (a modern duel/affray), satisfying the mob-action predicate for armed violence.
- Barnes’ defense: the shooters were acting at cross-purposes (one shot at the other); "acting together" requires concerted action—an agreement or common purpose—which was not proved.
- The jury received pattern mob-action instructions using the phrase "acting together" but was not instructed on its meaning.
- The appellate court framed the main legal question as whether "acting together" requires concerted action (agreement/common purpose) or is satisfied by mere participation in reciprocal violence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "acting together" in the mob-action statute requires concerted action (agreement or common purpose) | The State: participation in a gunfight (willingly engaging in reciprocal shooting) is sufficient; no common mindset or agreement is required | Barnes: "acting together" requires concerted action—an agreement or shared criminal purpose; mere exchange of gunfire does not suffice | Court: "acting together" requires concerted action (common purpose or an agreed course of conduct); mere reciprocal shooting at cross-purposes is insufficient |
| Whether evidence proved a common criminal purpose between Barnes and the other shooter | State did not assert a shared criminal purpose | Barnes: no shared purpose; shooters were trying to shoot one another, not a common victim | Held: No evidence of common purpose; reciprocal shooting is action at cross-purposes, not concerted action |
| Whether evidence proved an agreement (express or implied) to engage in a gunfight (affray/duel) | State: nonverbal conduct (pointing, displaying a gun, Barnes retrieving and firing his gun, not fleeing) established a nonverbal agreement to a gunfight | Barnes: facts show reactive, self‑defensive conduct after a threat; no verbal or objective evidence of acceptance of a challenge | Held: No evidence of an agreement to a gunfight; State failed to prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Sufficiency of evidence to support armed violence conviction predicated on mob action | State: evidence of participation in the gunfight = acting together = mob action predicate proved | Barnes: lacking concerted action/agreement, mob-action predicate not proved, so armed violence fails | Held: Evidence insufficient to prove mob action predicate; armed violence conviction reversed |
Key Cases Cited
- Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (federal district court described "acting together" as combined, conjoint, or concerted action)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- People v. Peterson, 273 Ill. App. 3d 412 (1995) (holding spontaneous reciprocal shootings are at "cross purposes," not concerted action)
- People v. Bywater, 223 Ill. 2d 477 (2006) (use of plain-meaning/statutory-construction rules in determining elements)
- Walter v. Northern Insurance Co. of N.Y., 370 Ill. 283 (1938) (historical explanation that "riot" involves persons "acting in concert" with a common purpose)
- People v. Carter, 213 Ill. 2d 295 (2004) (rule of lenity: ambiguous penal statutes construed in favor of accused)