People v. Barnes
89 N.E.3d 969
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- On July 9, 2009, Tyrone Barnes exchanged gunfire on a public street with an unidentified man; an errant shot from the other shooter killed innocent bystander Simeon Sanders.
- Barnes was tried for felony murder (predicated on aggravated discharge of a firearm) and for armed violence predicated on mob action; jury acquitted him of felony murder but convicted him of armed violence.
- The mob-action statute at issue criminalizes "the use of force or violence disturbing the public peace by 2 or more persons acting together and without authority of law."
- The State argued that "acting together" is satisfied when two people participate in a gunfight (i.e., mere mutual participation), likening the exchange to a spontaneous duel.
- Barnes argued "acting together" requires concerted action — an agreement or common purpose — and that mutual hostile gunfire (shooting at each other) is at cross-purposes and therefore not mob action.
- The trial jury never received a definitional instruction on "acting together." The appellate court reversed Barnes’s armed-violence conviction, holding the evidence did not prove the required concerted action.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does "acting together" in the mob-action statute require an agreement or common purpose, or is mere participation in mutual violence sufficient? | The People: participation in the gunfight equals acting together; no common purpose required. | Barnes: "acting together" requires concerted action — an agreement or shared criminal purpose; mutual hostile fire is at cross-purposes. | The court held "acting together" requires concerted action (agreement or common criminal purpose); mere reciprocal shooting is insufficient. |
| Was there evidence Barnes and the other shooter shared a common criminal purpose? | People did not argue common purpose. | Barnes: no evidence of common purpose; they shot at each other. | No evidence of a shared criminal purpose; parties acted at cross-purposes. |
| Was there evidence of an agreement (express or implied) to engage in a gunfight (an affray/duel)? | People: nonverbal conduct (pointing, displaying a gun, retrieving weapon, not fleeing) implied a challenge and acceptance. | Barnes: evidence shows reaction to threat and self-defense; no verbal or nonverbal agreement to fight. | No reasonable juror could infer an agreement to a gunfight from the short sequence of events. |
| Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the armed-violence conviction predicated on mob action? | People: yes — participation in the mutual gunfight disturbed the public peace. | Barnes: no — lack of concerted action or agreement. | Court reversed the armed-violence conviction for insufficient evidence of mob action. |
Key Cases Cited
- Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (interpreting "acting together" to mean concerted action)
- Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (U.S. 1971) (reversing injunction on other grounds)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (constitutional standard for sufficiency review)
- People v. Bywater, 223 Ill. 2d 477 (statutory interpretation principles)
- Walter v. Northern Ins. Co. of N.Y., 370 Ill. 283 (riot requires acting in concert/common purpose)
- People v. Rudecki, 309 Ill. 125 (riot/unlawful assembly require common design)
- People v. Peterson, 273 Ill. App. 3d 412 (exchange of gunfire held to be acting at cross-purposes, not concerted action)