People v. Arroyo
62 Cal. 4th 589
| Cal. | 2016Background
- On Oct. 19, 2012 police stopped a car in Santa Ana, found a loaded revolver, and arrested defendant Isaias Arroyo (a juvenile) among others.
- The Orange County District Attorney presented the matter to the grand jury, which returned an indictment charging conspiracy to commit murder and participation in a criminal street gang, and found reasonable cause that Arroyo fell within Welf. & Inst. Code § 707(d)(4).
- Arroyo demurred, arguing § 707(d)(4) requires prosecution of juveniles in discretionary direct-file cases to be commenced by information after a magistrate’s preliminary hearing (not by grand jury indictment).
- The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed; the Court of Appeal reversed.
- The California Supreme Court reviewed whether § 707(d)(4) precludes initiating discretionary direct-file juvenile prosecutions by grand jury indictment and affirmed the Court of Appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Arroyo) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 707(d)(4) requires prosecutions under discretionary direct-file to be commenced by information (with a magistrate’s preliminary hearing) rather than by grand jury indictment | § 707(d)(4) does not mandate initiation by information; it permits any accusatory pleading and, if an information is used, the magistrate makes the reasonable-cause finding at the preliminary hearing | § 707(d)(4)’s reference to the preliminary hearing and magistrate finding creates a statutory right to a magistrate’s determination and thus precludes indictment | Court held § 707(d)(4) does not bar grand jury indictments; the grand jury serves as the functional equivalent and may make the required reasonable-cause determination |
| Whether a grand jury must make the “reasonable cause” finding for juveniles in § 707(d) cases | Grand jury must make the equivalent reasonable-cause finding when prosecution is initiated by indictment; the finding may be express or implied from the record | Argued that only a magistrate at a preliminary hearing should make that probable-cause determination because of procedural protections | Court held the grand jury, properly instructed and supported by evidence, satisfies the statute’s requirement; an express finding is not always required |
| Whether allowing indictment violates equal protection or alters proof standards for juveniles charged by indictment vs. information | Indictment does not reduce proof requirements or deny equal protection; procedural remedies (e.g., Penal Code § 995) address prosecutorial overreach | Argued indictment route affords fewer procedural protections (no preliminary hearing, limited confrontation) and thus is unfair | Court rejected constitutional challenges in this context and noted available procedural safeguards to challenge indictments |
| Whether prior decisions required a contrary outcome | People argued Guillory and related cases support indictments for juveniles after Proposition 21 | Defendant relied on People v. Superior Court (Gevorgyan) which held § 707(d)(4) unambiguously required a preliminary hearing | Court disapproved Gevorgyan to the extent it held § 707(d)(4) requires initiation only by information and relied on Guillory reasoning to permit indictments |
Key Cases Cited
- Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist., 29 Cal.4th 911 (statutory interpretation principles govern voter initiatives)
- Robert L. v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.4th 894 (approach to construing initiative language and voters’ intent)
- Guillory v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.4th 168 (grand jury as functional equivalent of magistrate; permissibility of indictment in direct-file contexts)
- Manduley v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.4th 537 (constitutional review of Proposition 21 direct-file provisions)
- People v. Aguirre, 227 Cal.App.3d 373 (grand jury power to indict public offenses)
- People v. Superior Court (Gevorgyan), 91 Cal.App.4th 602 (disapproved to extent it required initiation by information)
- Stark v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.4th 368 (discussion of grand jury and preliminary-examination equivalency)
