People v. Applewhite
171 N.E.3d 891
Ill. App. Ct.2020Background
- In 2001, Samuel Applewhite (then 17) was charged in two separate shootings; he pleaded guilty in 2003 to first‑degree murder (Marshall Young) and aggravated battery with a firearm (Lamar Smith).
- The court imposed concurrent sentences: a mandatory 45‑year term for murder (20 years + 25‑year firearm enhancement) and 12 years for aggravated battery.
- The battery conviction was later vacated after a collateral challenge to sentencing formality, leaving Applewhite serving a 45‑year term.
- In a pro se postconviction petition, Applewhite argued his 45‑year sentence is a de facto life term in violation of the Eighth Amendment under Miller and its progeny.
- The trial court dismissed the petition at the first stage; this court initially affirmed but the Illinois Supreme Court ordered reconsideration in light of People v. Buffer (which set 40 years as the de facto life line).
- On rehearing, the State conceded that under Buffer a 45‑year term is a de facto life sentence and that the trial court did not consider Miller‑type youth mitigation; the appellate court vacated the 45‑year sentence and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Applewhite’s 45‑year term is a de facto life sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment | People ultimately agreed that under Buffer a sentence over 40 years is de facto life and unconstitutional where youth was not considered | 45 years is a de facto life sentence for a juvenile and violates Miller/Graham/Roper because the trial court never considered youth mitigating factors | Yes. Under Buffer (40‑year line), 45 years is a de facto life sentence; sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing |
| Whether a guilty plea waives this constitutional challenge | People conceded the plea does not bar a challenge to a sentence the court had no power to impose constitutionally | Plea does not waive the Miller‑based claim because it challenges the power to impose the sentence, not the plea’s validity | Held: plea does not bar the claim; defendant may challenge the sentence |
| Proper remedy: second‑stage postconviction development vs immediate resentencing | People (and defendant) requested remand for resentencing rather than further postconviction factual development | Same — requested resentencing | Court vacated the 45‑year sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing; no additional first‑stage factfinding required |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (juveniles may not be sentenced to life without parole for nonhomicide offenses)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (death penalty unconstitutional for crimes committed by juveniles)
- Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798 (guilty pleas do not bar certain collateral constitutional claims when sentence exceeded court’s lawful power)
- People v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 (Illinois Supreme Court: 40 years is the cutoff; more than 40 years imposed on juvenile is a de facto life sentence requiring Miller‑type consideration)
- People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271 (Illinois Supreme Court: life or de facto life for juveniles unconstitutional absent youth‑based consideration)
- People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655 (Illinois Supreme Court: life sentences for juveniles require individualized consideration of youth and its attendant characteristics)