People v. Aponte
42 Misc. 3d 868
N.Y. Sup. Ct.2013Background
- 1983 judgment convicting Price of second-degree murder, first-degree robbery (two counts), first-degree assault, and second-degree weapon possession, with substantial concurrent and consecutive indeterminate life terms and minimums.
- Aggregate sentence included an additional 25-year term with a 12.5-year minimum, and separate June 1983 sentence for attempted murder (25 years with 8.5-year minimum).
- On direct appeal, Appellate Division reduced the weapon conviction sentence but affirmed otherwise; Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal in 1988.
- 1996 CPL 440.10 motions by Price were denied; subsequent 2001 appellate denial of a CPL 440.10 appeal; habeas petition in SDNY dismissed in 2002.
- July 2013 Price, acting pro se, moved under CPL 440.20 to vacate his sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds, asserting he was 17 at the time of the crimes.
- Trial court denied the motion, concluding the sentence was lawful and not cruel or unusual under the Eighth Amendment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the sentence is unauthorized or invalid under CPL 440.20 | Price asserts sentences became illegal due to youth status. | People argues sentences comport with law; youth status does not render them invalid. | Sentence was lawful and valid; CPL 440.20 claim denied. |
| Whether 17-year-old status at time of crime makes the sentence cruel or unusual under the Eighth Amendment | Age at crime should limit punishment; 17 is treated as juvenile offender today. | 17-year-old status does not automatically preclude adult sentencing; statute permissible. | No Eighth Amendment violation; current and historical sentencing scheme valid for 17-year-old offender. |
| Whether Miller, Graham, or Roper undermine the sentence | These precedents show youth imprints on punishment; thus the sentence is unconstitutional. | Those decisions do not apply to this offense/sentencing structure; defendant not sentenced to life without parole. | Inapplicable; defendant remains paroled-eligible and not sentenced to LWOP. |
| Whether the sentencing scheme, considering factors of rehabilitation, deterrence, and recidivism, is disproportionate | The severity and length exceed what is warranted for a 17-year-old offender. | Court considers gravity of offense and offender characteristics; punishment is proportionate. | No disproportion; sentencing justified by offense gravity and offender’s conduct. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v Pagnotta, 25 N.Y.2d 333 (1969) (strong presumption of validity; youth factors considered in sentencing)
- Wasmuth v. Allen, 14 N.Y.2d 391 (1964) (youthful age and sentencing considerations)
- I. L. F. Y. Co. v Temporary State Hous. Rent Commn., 10 N.Y.2d 263 (1961) (youth and applicable statutory limits context)
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (unconstitutional for LWOP under 18; distinguishes youth impact but not controlling here)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (juvenile offender constraints; not controlling for the present case)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty invalid for under 18; not applicable to adult sentencing here)
- People v Thompson, 83 N.Y.2d 477 (1994) (factors of proportionality: gravity and offender character)
- People v Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100 (1975) (sentencing considerations for proportionality)