People v. Anthony
244 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499
| Cal. Ct. App. 5th | 2019Background
- On May 16, 2009, four men (Stephon Anthony, Samuel Flowers, Anthony Price, Rafael Campbell) drove together into West Berkeley; Flowers fatally shot Charles Davis; the group fled in Anthony's Cadillac, then led police on a high‑speed chase causing collisions that killed two others. All four were arrested, tried jointly, convicted of multiple murders and related enhancements, and each received life without parole for the Davis murder.
- Prosecution theory: defendants were active members of the North Side Oakland (NSO) gang acting in gang retaliation for the April 23, 2009 killing of Nguyen Ngo; evidence included eyewitnesses, firearms and gang paraphernalia found in the Cadillac, phone records and gang‑related tattoos/photos/lyrics.
- Pretrial and trial disputes included: (1) admissibility under Miranda of Anthony’s post‑arrest statements (May 18, 2009), (2) admissibility under Sanchez/Crawford of portions of the gang expert’s testimony that relied on out‑of‑court, case‑specific hearsay, (3) alleged prosecutorial misconduct and jury discrimination claims, and (4) whether newer law (Senate Bill 1437) could be raised on direct appeal.
- Trial court admitted Anthony’s May 18 Oakland statements and substantial portions of the gang expert’s testimony; some May 17 Berkeley statements were excluded. Cunnie (gang expert) testified about NSO background and opined defendants were NSO members; some of his case‑specific hearsay preceded Sanchez (2016).
- The Court of Appeal (published portions) found (a) admission of Anthony’s May 18 statements violated Miranda but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (b) some of Cunnie’s case‑specific hearsay testimony ran afoul of Sanchez/Crawford but any error was harmless; (c) Chiu instructional error (natural and probable consequences theory for first‑degree murder) was harmless because the jury relied on valid aider‑and‑abettor/conspiracy theories; and (d) Senate Bill 1437 relief must be sought via Penal Code § 1170.95 petition in the trial court, not by direct appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Anthony’s May 18 statements (Miranda) | People: Anthony voluntarily sought Oakland police and spoke as a witness; no custodial interrogation requiring Miranda | Anthony: He had asserted Miranda rights May 17; May 18 Oakland officers re‑initiated interrogation without re‑advisal, so statements inadmissible | Court: Admission was Miranda error but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; convictions stand |
| Gang expert (Cunnie) reliance on case‑specific hearsay (Sanchez/Crawford) | People: Expert may rely on hearsay for background and to form opinion; much evidence independently admissible | Defendants: Expert relayed testimonial, case‑specific hearsay to prove NSO membership and motive, violating Sanchez and Crawford | Court: Some testimony violated Sanchez/Crawford but majority admissible as background or based on independently admitted evidence; any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt |
| Instruction on natural and probable consequences for first‑degree murder (Chiu) | People: Alternate theories given; jury convicted on valid direct aiding/conspiracy theory | Defendants: Instruction allowed forbidden theory (Chiu) so conviction invalid | Court: Trial court erred under Chiu but error harmless; jury verdicts supported by direct aider/conspirator findings and special circumstances showing intent to kill |
| Retroactive relief under Senate Bill 1437 | Defendants: New law reduces liability; Estrada retroactivity enables direct appeal relief | People: Senate Bill 1437 created § 1170.95 petition procedure; relief must be sought in sentencing court | Court: Followed Martinez/Conley/DeHoyos—defendants must use § 1170.95 petition in trial court; cannot obtain that relief on direct appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (Miranda warnings required for custodial interrogation)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981) (post‑invocation reinitiation rule for counsel requests)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (testimonial hearsay and confrontation clause limits)
- Sanchez v. People, 63 Cal.4th 665 (Cal. 2016) (expert may not relate case‑specific hearsay as true; expert may rely on hearsay for background but case‑specific facts must be proved independently)
- People v. Gardeley, 14 Cal.4th 605 (Cal. 1996) (prior framing of expert reliance on hearsay pre‑Sanchez)
- People v. Chiu, 59 Cal.4th 155 (Cal. 2014) (natural and probable consequences doctrine cannot be used to convict an aider/abettor of first‑degree premeditated murder)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967) (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard)
- People v. Conley, 63 Cal.4th 646 (Cal. 2016) (retroactivity and exclusive petition procedures for ameliorative law changes)
- People v. DeHoyos, 4 Cal.5th 594 (Cal. 2018) (same framework on retroactivity for ballot‑initiated ameliorative changes)
- Martinez v. People, 31 Cal.App.5th 719 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (interpreting § 1170.95 petition process as exclusive route for Senate Bill 1437 relief)