People v. Anderson
208 Cal. App. 4th 851
Cal. Ct. App.2012Background
- Anderson, a physician and GTL founder, was convicted by jury of continuous sexual abuse of a child under 14 and three counts of lewd act with a child under 14.
- Victim Y.Z. testified to a five-year pattern of abuse beginning when she was in fourth grade, with abuse increasingly frequent as she aged.
- Anderson sent supportive emails and engaged in conversations with Y, including a recorded library confrontation in which he apologized and attempted to minimize the conduct.
- Evidence included emails and a recorded conversation; Anderson testified he pressured Y to succeed and that apologies were to placate her.
- The defense challenged the exclusion of a four-page letter to a police chief about the investigation and argued for admission of conduct after the library confrontation; the court excluded it under hearsay and 352, resulting in asserted trial-right impacts.
- The trial court convicted on one count of continuous sexual abuse (288.5) and three counts of lewd act (288(a)); sentence was 14 years in state prison.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the letter to Chief Farris was admissible as nonhearsay or for impeachment. | Anderson argues letter not hearsay and admissible. | State asserts letter is hearsay and prejudicial. | Exclusion proper; not hearsay; not reversible error. |
| Whether excluding the post-confrontation conduct evidence violated the right to present a defense. | Anderson contends exclusion deprived defense. | Evidence marginally relevant and confusing; 352 proper. | No due-process violation; ruling upheld. |
| Whether conviction on 288.5 with generic testimony and three 288(a) counts is proper after Jones. | People may use generic testimony to prove continuous abuse and satisfy unanimity. | Defendant asserts one-count limit per victim; generic vs specific conflict. | Proper; Jones permits generic testimony; multiple offenses outside the continuous period may be charged. |
| Whether the uncharged-offenses instruction lowered the People’s burden of proof beyond Reliford/Villatoro principles. | Propensity evidence preponderance standard was appropriate. | Instruction misapplied; could prejudice. | Instruction proper; did not dilute burden; properly framed. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Williams, 40 Cal.4th 287 (Cal. 2006) (post-arrest statements may be excluded for trustworthiness)
- People v. Jurado, 38 Cal.4th 72 (Cal. 2006) (trustworthiness of postconfrontation statements; admissibility limits)
- People v. Reliford, 29 Cal.4th 1007 (Cal. 2003) (unclear preponderance use for propensity evidence)
- People v. Jones, 51 Cal.3d 294 (Cal. 1990) (generic testimony can support continuous-sexual-abuse findings)
- People v. Johnson, 28 Cal.4th 240 (Cal. 2002) (charging continuous and discrete offenses; unanimity considerations)
- People v. Cortes, 71 Cal.App.4th 62 (Cal. App. 1999) (discussion of charging continuous vs discrete offenses)
- People v. Avina, 14 Cal.App.4th 1303 (Cal. App. 1993) (one-victim charging limits for continuous sexual abuse)
- People v. Tewksbury, 15 Cal.3d 953 (Cal. 1976) (burden-shifting when collateral factual issues arise)