People v. Almond
2015 IL 113817
| Ill. | 2015Background
- On Oct. 30, 2008, Chicago officers approached Antonio Almond in a liquor store after an anonymous tip about drug sales; Almond said “I just got to let you know I got a gun on me,” and officers recovered a loaded .38 from his waistband. Almond had prior felony convictions.
- Almond was charged on multiple firearm counts; the two counts central to this appeal were: (1) armed habitual criminal (possession of a firearm) and (2) unlawful use of a weapon (UUW) by a felon (possession of firearm ammunition).
- The trial court denied Almond’s suppression motion, crediting officer testimony and concluding the encounter was consensual; Almond was convicted at a bench trial and sentenced (6 years on the most serious, 3 years concurrently on the other).
- On appeal the appellate court affirmed suppression rulings but, applying the one-act, one-crime rule and construing the statutes, vacated the UUW conviction for ammunition possession as duplicative of possession of a single loaded firearm.
- The Illinois Supreme Court granted review to decide (1) whether the amended UUW-by-a-felon statute authorizes separate convictions for possession of a firearm and possession of the ammunition in that firearm, and (2) whether the stop/search violated the Fourth Amendment.
- The Court held the amended statute unambiguously authorizes separate convictions for firearm and ammunition possession, rejected Almond’s one-act, one-crime challenge, and affirmed denial of suppression because the encounter was consensual.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Almond) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the UUW-by-a-felon statute permits separate convictions for simultaneous possession of a firearm and the ammunition loaded in it | The statute’s plain text (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(e)) makes possession of each firearm or firearm ammunition a separate violation; the 2005 amendment (post-Carter) shows legislative intent to authorize separate convictions | The amendment did not abrogate the one-act, one-crime rule for a single loaded firearm; statute ambiguous re: loaded vs. unloaded and simultaneous possession | Held: Statute is unambiguous; the amendment authorizes separate convictions for firearm and ammunition possession. |
| Whether the one-act, one-crime rule precludes convictions for firearm possession and ammunition possession arising from the same loaded firearm | Separate statutory prohibitions for firearm and for ammunition mean two distinct acts/units of prosecution; simultaneous possession ≠ single act | Possessing a loaded firearm is a single physical act; prosecutorial charging cannot split one act into multiple offenses absent legislative authority | Held: No one-act, one-crime violation; possession of firearm and possession of ammunition are separate acts supporting separate convictions as charged. |
| Whether the encounter/search/seizure violated the Fourth Amendment (suppression issue) | The officer’s approach was a consensual encounter; after Almond volunteered he had a gun, frisk and seizure were proper; suppression denial proper | The stop was a Terry stop unsupported by reasonable suspicion (anonymous tip + flight); a reasonable person would feel seized—suppression warranted | Held: Interaction was consensual (no Mendenhall factors); no seizure pre-search; suppression denial affirmed. |
| Whether Almond forfeited his Fourth Amendment claim by not raising it posttrial | State argued forfeiture; but the issue was raised at trial and review on direct appeal is appropriate under Cregan | Preserved because raised at the suppression hearing and review on direct appeal is permitted | Held: Forfeiture argument rejected; Court reviewed the Fourth Amendment claim on the merits. |
Key Cases Cited
- Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (anonymous-tip lacking indicia of reliability cannot justify a Terry stop)
- United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (test for seizure: whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave; presence/authority factors)
- People v. Carter, 213 Ill. 2d 295 (statute ambiguous pre-amendment; simultaneous possession previously treated as single offense absent express legislative language)
- People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551 (one-act, one-crime rule—cannot convict multiple offenses based on same physical act)
- People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335 (charging instrument must reflect State’s intent to treat conduct as multiple acts to sustain multiple convictions)
- People v. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d 183 (interrelationship of acts does not preclude multiple convictions where multiple acts exist)