People v. Almond
32 N.E.3d 535
| Ill. | 2015Background
- On Oct. 30, 2008, Chicago officers entered a liquor store after an anonymous tip about drug sales; they approached Almond and recovered a loaded .38 from his waistband. Almond had prior felony convictions.
- Almond was charged with multiple firearm offenses; at trial he was convicted (bench trial) and sentenced (6 years for armed habitual criminal; concurrent 3 years for UUW by a felon, among other counts).
- At suppression, Almond disputed the officers’ account and argued the encounter was an unlawful Terry stop based on an uncorroborated anonymous tip (Florida v. J.L.); trial court credited the officers and denied suppression.
- On appeal the appellate court rejected Almond’s Fourth Amendment claim but held, under one-act/one-crime reasoning, that simultaneous possession of a loaded firearm and its ammunition could support only one conviction and vacated the UUW conviction.
- The State appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, arguing the amended UUW-by-a-felon statute (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(e)) authorizes separate convictions for possession of a firearm and possession of firearm ammunition; Almond cross-appealed the suppression ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Almond) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the UUW-by-a-felon statute authorizes separate convictions for possession of a firearm and possession of ammunition contained in it | Statute’s plain language (24-1.1(e): “possession of each firearm or firearm ammunition constitutes a single and separate violation”) unambiguously permits separate convictions | Amendment didn’t abrogate one-act/one-crime for a single loaded firearm; statute ambiguous as to loaded vs. unloaded and simultaneous possession | Held: Yes — the amended statute unambiguously authorizes separate convictions for firearm and ammunition possession (statute covers either item and treats each as a separate violation). |
| Whether the one-act, one-crime rule bars convictions for both armed habitual criminal (firearm) and UUW-by-a-felon (ammunition) when the firearm was loaded | Two distinct statutory offenses (possession of firearm; possession of ammunition) are separate acts; simultaneity alone doesn’t make them a single act under King | Possession of a loaded firearm is a single physical act; absent legislative authorization the State cannot split one physical act into multiple convictions | Held: No violation — possession of firearm and possession of ammunition are separate acts supporting concurrent convictions; one-act/one-crime does not bar both convictions as charged. |
| Whether the initial encounter was consensual or an unconstitutional seizure (Terry) based on an anonymous tip | Interaction was consensual or, alternatively, defendant’s admission that he had a gun provided justification for the frisk/arrest | Anonymous tip + movements of others did not create reasonable suspicion; encounter was not consensual and thus seizure/stop was unlawful under Florida v. J.L. | Held: Encounter was consensual; Mendenhall factors absent; trial court’s credibility finding for officers not against manifest weight; suppression denial affirmed. |
| Remedy / disposition | Reinstate convictions vacated by appellate court | Vacate UUW conviction and sentence (as appellate court ordered) | Held: Supreme Court reverses part of appellate court — reinstates UUW conviction and sentence; affirms suppression ruling. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Carter, 213 Ill. 2d 295 (2004) (construed preamendment UUW statute as ambiguous re: simultaneous possession; favored single conviction absent contrary statutory language)
- People v. King, 66 Ill. 2d 551 (1977) (established one-act, one-crime rule: multiple convictions not allowed for same physical act)
- Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) (an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability cannot alone justify a Terry stop and frisk)
- United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (person is seized only when, by physical force or show of authority, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave; lists factors)
- People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335 (2001) (discusses when charging instruments must reflect State’s intent to treat conduct as multiple acts under King)
- People v. Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d 183 (1996) (interrelationship of acts does not bar multiple convictions if multiple acts as defined in King exist)
- People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530 (2006) (not every police-citizen encounter is a seizure; consensual encounters do not implicate Fourth Amendment)