2017 CO 90
Colo.2017Background
- Defendant Stephen Ahuero was charged with two counts of sexual abuse of a child; trial set for November 13, 2012.
- On October 12, 2012 defense counsel moved for a continuance, citing heavy trial schedule and having less than three weeks to prepare; motion was conclusory and sought a February/March 2013 date.
- At the October 15 hearing the trial court denied the continuance, citing docket concerns, the priority of child sexual-assault cases, the victim’s family’s desire for prompt resolution, and the prospect that a different judge would have to preside.
- The court did grant a short continuance for a conflicting motions hearing; defense counsel participated in that hearing and later conducted cross-examinations and gave an opening statement at trial, affirming readiness when the trial began.
- Jury convicted Ahuero on both counts; on appeal the court of appeals reversed, finding the denial of the continuance violated the Sixth Amendment by denying effective assistance of counsel. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of continuance was an abuse of discretion | People: Trial court did not abuse discretion given docket, victim family’s interests, and priority of child-sexual-assault cases | Ahuero: Denial left counsel insufficient time to prepare, violating Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance | Denial was not an abuse of discretion under totality of circumstances; trial court reasonably weighed specific docket and victim-related factors against a conclusory request for delay |
| Whether People v. Brown counsel-of-choice factors apply to general continuance denials | People: Brown factors are not properly applied to ordinary continuance denials | Ahuero: (implicit) Brown factors support finding abuse | Court did not reach this issue because it resolved the case under ordinary continuance-abuse standards |
| Whether adequacy of pretrial investigation can be decided on direct appeal | People: Should wait for collateral ineffective-assistance claim rather than decide on direct appeal when record is sparse | Ahuero: Direct review appropriate because the record showed lack of preparation prejudiced defense | Court declined to reach because it found no abuse of discretion in denying continuance |
| Whether actual prejudice may be presumed from existence of undiscovered evidence | People: Prejudice should not be presumed without showing continuance would have uncovered evidence | Ahuero: Existence of potentially discoverable evidence supports prejudice | Court did not decide this question because denial was not an abuse of discretion on the record presented |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Crow, 789 P.2d 1104 (Colo. 1990) (standard for reviewing continuance denials and abuse of discretion)
- People v. Brown, 322 P.3d 214 (Colo. 2014) (counsel-of-choice factors referenced in continuance/right-to-counsel contexts)
- Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983) (trial-court scheduling discretion and limits on continuances)
- Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964) (due-process limits on insistence upon expeditiousness when delay is justified)
- People v. Hampton, 758 P.2d 1344 (Colo. 1988) (evaluate reasons presented to trial judge when reviewing continuance denials)
