People v. Abdullah, 2019 IL 123492

Background

In 2004 Abdullah was indicted for first‑degree murder and attempted murder; no firearm enhancements were charged in the indictment.
After a 2005 conviction, the trial court initially sentenced Abdullah to concurrent terms (40 years for murder; 20 years for attempted murder).
The State filed a post‑sentencing motion seeking mandatory minimums and firearm enhancements; Abdullah filed a timely notice of appeal; the trial court struck the appeal, resentenced Abdullah to consecutive enhanced terms, then later modified one enhancement.
Abdullah filed a pro se section 2‑1401 petition arguing the resentencings were void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction once his appeal was perfected and that the attempted‑murder firearm enhancement was unconstitutional under People v. Morgan.
The trial court found the enhancements were imposed without proper charging/presentation to a jury but deemed the error harmless; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding the State lacked authority to seek sentence increases by postjudgment motion, so the resentencings were void and the original concurrent sentences were reinstated.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the State’s postjudgment motion to increase sentence rendered Abdullah’s timely notice of appeal ineffective so the trial court retained jurisdiction to resentence	Abdullah: Rule 606(b) only voids a notice of appeal when postjudgment motions are filed by defense counsel (or an unrepresented defendant), so his timely notice perfected the appeal and the trial court thereafter lacked jurisdiction to resentence	State: Rule 606(b) should be read to allow a postsentencing motion by the State to render a defendant’s premature notice of appeal ineffective; no statute forbids the State’s motion	Held: The State had no statutory or rule authorization to file a motion to increase sentence; “counsel” in Rule 606(b) means defense counsel; the State’s motion had no jurisdictional effect, the subsequent resentencings are void, and the original sentences are reinstated.
Whether the attempted‑murder firearm enhancement was void ab initio under People v. Morgan and therefore could not be applied	Abdullah: Morgan made the attempted‑murder enhancement unconstitutional when his offense occurred, so enhancement was void	State: Sharpe later overruled Morgan and the enhancement was not void when applied; State conceded the 20‑year enhancement should be vacated on ex post facto grounds	Held: Supreme Court did not restate a merits ruling on Morgan because it concluded the resentencings were void; original concurrent sentences were reinstated (which removes the enhanced attempted‑murder term).
Proper remedy and scope of Supreme Court intervention: vacate resentencings or remand for resentencing	Abdullah: Vacate the November 2005 and January 2006 orders and reinstate the original concurrent sentences from August 17, 2005	State: Affirm modified sentences or, alternatively, have court exercise supervisory authority to impose a sentence consistent with ex post facto principles or remand for resentencing	Held: Court vacated the void resentencings, reinstated the original concurrent sentences, and declined to invoke supervisory authority; the State may still seek mandamus if appropriate.

Key Cases Cited

People v. Morgan, 203 Ill. 2d 470 (Illinois 2003) (held attempted‑murder firearm enhancement unconstitutional under state proportionate‑penalties clause)
People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481 (Illinois 2005) (overruled Morgan and reinstated attempted‑murder enhancements)
People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916 (Illinois 2015) (State lacks general appellate remedy to challenge sentencing orders; mandamus is available)
People v. Price, 2016 IL 118613 (Illinois 2016) (defines circumstances when a judgment is void: lack of jurisdiction or statute facially unconstitutional)
People v. Bounds, 182 Ill. 2d 1 (Illinois 1998) (a timely notice of appeal vests jurisdiction in the appellate court immediately)
People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1 (Illinois 2007) (section 2‑1401 is a civil remedy that can be used postconviction to attack final judgments)