934 N.W.2d 748
Mich.2019Background
- Victim Nicholas Abraham (Monroe County resident) traveled to Detroit (Wayne County) where an acquaintance bought heroin from Romon McBurrows; they used some in a parking lot. Abraham later died in Monroe County from fentanyl toxicity.
- McBurrows was charged in Monroe County with delivery of a controlled substance causing death (MCL 750.317a).
- McBurrows moved to dismiss for improper venue; the trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals granted interlocutory review and reversed, holding venue was proper in Wayne County. The People appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court.
- The sole legal question before the Supreme Court: whether venue is proper in the county where the death occurred (Monroe) when the delivery occurred elsewhere (Wayne).
- The Supreme Court reviewed common-law venue principles, statutory venue exceptions (MCL 762.5 and MCL 762.8), and federal venue analogues to resolve where the offense under MCL 750.317a is committed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper venue under common-law rule for MCL 750.317a | Venue may be in county where death occurred because death is an element of the offense | Venue is in county where delivery occurred; death elsewhere does not shift venue | Venue is at locus of delivery (Wayne County); death elsewhere does not establish venue under the general rule |
| Nature of MCL 750.317a (penalty enhancement vs. distinct offense) | The statute is an enhancement of delivery crime—crime complete at delivery | The statute creates a distinct offense whose elements include death | MCL 750.317a is a distinct offense with its own elements (delivery, consumption, death); still committed where delivery occurred |
| MCL 762.5 (wounds, injury, poison administered across counties) | Delivery/poisoning can be treated like administering a poison or inflicting a mortal wound; venue in county of death (Monroe) is proper | Statute requires direct infliction or administration to victim; delivery to an intermediary is not "inflicting" or "administering" to decedent | MCL 762.5 does not apply—defendant did not directly inflict or administer to the decedent as contemplated by the statute or Southwick |
| MCL 762.8 (felony consisting of multiple acts in different counties) | Consumption and death are acts in perpetration of the felony, so venue may be where those acts occurred | "Perpetration" implies acts by defendant or agent; victim’s independent acts are not acts in perpetration by defendant | MCL 762.8 does not apply—victim’s independent consumption/death were not acts by defendant or his agent in perpetration of the felony |
Key Cases Cited
- People v Plunkett, 485 Mich 50 (2010) (statute punishes role in placing controlled substance into commerce even if not directly linked to resultant death)
- People v Duffield, 387 Mich 300 (1972) (for homicide/manslaughter, venue lies where mortal blow was given)
- People v Southwick, 272 Mich 258 (1935) (venue under MCL 762.5 upheld where defendant acted directly upon victim or provided medicines/drugs to her)
- Swart v Kimball, 43 Mich 443 (1880) (historical protection of trial by jury in county where offense was committed)
- People v Lee, 334 Mich 217 (1956) (discussing evolution of vicinage rule and legislative authority to alter venue statutes)
- People v Richards, 247 Mich 608 (1929) (upholding statute providing alternative venue as consistent with offense’s gist)
- United States v Anderson, 328 US 699 (1946) (locus delicti determined from nature of the crime and location of acts constituting it)
- United States v Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 US 275 (1999) (verb-test useful but cannot be applied rigidly; inquiry is into nature of offense)
- Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466 (2000) (elements that increase prescribed penalty must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt)