People of Michigan v. Paul J Betts Jr, 148981

Background

Paul Betts pleaded guilty in 1993 to second-degree criminal sexual conduct and was later required to register under Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA).
SORA was enacted in 1994 as a confidential law-enforcement tool and was amended over time; the 2011 amendments added a tiered system, broadened public disclosure, imposed 3-day in-person reporting for many life changes, periodic in-person verification, and 1,000-foot student-safety (residency/employment/loitering) zones.
In 2012 Betts failed to report a change of residence, an e-mail address, and a vehicle purchase under the 2011 SORA rules and was charged under MCL 28.729(1)(a); he entered a conditional no-contest plea to preserve an ex post facto challenge.
The Sixth Circuit (Does #1–5 v. Snyder) had previously held the 2011 SORA punitive in effect; federal district courts later enjoined retroactive enforcement for some registrants.
The Michigan Supreme Court held that applying the 2011 SORA retroactively to persons whose predicate crimes predated the 2011 amendments violates state and federal Ex Post Facto Clauses, vacated Betts’s conviction, and remanded; it declined severance or revival as an appropriate remedy and left the 2011 SORA’s prospective application intact.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether retroactive application of the 2011 SORA violates ex post facto prohibitions	2011 SORA is civil/regulatory (public safety); retroactive application is permissible	2011 SORA is punitive in purpose or effect; retroactive application increases punishment	Held unconstitutional as applied retroactively: 2011 SORA is punitive in aggregate and violates ex post facto provisions
Whether the Legislature intended SORA to be civil or criminal	Legislative text and placement indicate civil/regulatory intent (public safety)	Legislative enforcement mechanism and criminal sanctions indicate punitive effect	Court: legislative intent was civil, but punitive effects in 2011 amendments negate that intent
Whether the 2011 SORA is punitive in effect (Mendoza‑Martinez factors)	Many provisions are regulatory and rationally related to public safety; any punitive effects are incidental	Cumulative effects (banishment-like zones, shaming via public data, parole-like supervision, onerous in-person reporting and prison sanctions) are punitive	Court: under Mendoza‑Martinez factors (history/tradition; affirmative restraint; traditional aims; rational connection; excessiveness) the aggregate effects are punitive
Appropriate remedy (severability / revival / application of later amendments)	Sever the offending provisions or apply 2020 amendments / conform to SORNA; or revive pre-2011 SORA for retroactive cases	Entire retroactive application is unconstitutional; conviction must be vacated	Court: severance or revival would require unlawful legislative policymaking or produce operability problems; remedy is to bar retroactive application and vacate Betts’s conviction; prospective application unaffected

Key Cases Cited

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (establishes two-step test and Mendoza‑Martinez factors for determining whether a registration scheme is punitive in effect)
Kennedy v. Mendoza‑Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (articulates nonexhaustive factors for punishment versus regulatory characterization)
People v. Earl, 495 Mich. 33 (2014) (Michigan two‑step framework: legislative intent then punitive‑effect analysis under Mendoza‑Martinez)
Does #1–5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sixth Circuit held Michigan’s 2011 SORA punitive in aggregate and unconstitutional when applied retroactively)
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (requires clearest proof to overcome legislative intent that a statute is civil)
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981) (remedial principle directing application of the law in effect when the crime occurred where possible)
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002) (background on recidivism assertions referenced in excessiveness analysis)