People of Michigan v. Najee Sharif Wilkins, 332430

Background

In 2008, 17‑year‑old Khiry Walker was shot in the head in a Grand Rapids park; ballistics indicated a .22 caliber bullet and casings were recovered after snow melted. Najee Wilkins (defendant) was charged and convicted by a jury of second‑degree murder and perjury for lying at an investigative subpoena proceeding.
Key eyewitnesses (Dareyon York, Arthur Brown) placed Wilkins pursuing and shooting Walker; other witnesses and cell records corroborated portions of the accounts. Several witnesses initially lied or were reluctant to testify but later implicated Wilkins.
Substantial evidence showed Wilkins and associates threatened or attempted to intimidate witnesses (jail visits, recorded calls, threatening letters), and some witnesses refused to testify at trial.
The prosecution introduced other‑acts evidence of witness tampering to show consciousness of guilt and to explain witnesses’ reluctance; the defense challenged numerous evidentiary rulings, prosecutorial comments, jury instructions, sufficiency, sentencing, and counsel performance on appeal.
Trial court sentenced Wilkins to 45–100 years for second‑degree murder and 10–40 years for perjury; the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of witness‑tampering evidence (MRE 404(b) / MRE 403)	Evidence of threats and tampering shows consciousness of guilt and explains witness reluctance; admissible for non‑propensity purposes.	Evidence was unfairly prejudicial and irrelevant to prove Wilkins shot Walker.	Admissible: probative of consciousness of guilt and witness credibility; prejudice did not substantially outweigh probative value.
Admissibility of AD Christian’s testimony (hearsay/personal knowledge)	Testimony was permissible or at least a close call; court discretion appropriate.	AD lacked first‑hand knowledge; testimony was inadmissible hearsay.	No abuse of discretion; any error harmless because feud was otherwise well supported.
Admission of Rodney Lewis’s prior testimony / Confrontation Clause	Prior testimony was admissible (MRE 804(b)(1)); Lewis was unavailable after refusing to testify; defense had similar motive/opportunity at preliminary exam.	Cross‑examination at preliminary exam was inadequate; Lewis was available and Confrontation Clause implicated.	Admissible: Lewis was unavailable (refused to testify), prior cross‑examination adequate; Confrontation forfeited by defendant’s intimidation.
Prosecutorial or police vouching / misconduct (closing, references to intimidated witnesses)	Prosecutor’s references were proper arguments and tied to evidence of tampering; one stray line insufficient to prejudice.	Improper vouching and reliance on witness‑silence inferences denied a fair trial.	Mostly no reversible error: most remarks tied to evidence; one improper comment by prosecutor was unobjected and not plain error.
Use of evidence about non‑testifying witnesses (Detective testimony that Welch/Lewis refused) & Confrontation/Due Process	Testimony explaining refusals was necessary after prosecutor referenced expected testimony in opening and to explain witness gaps.	Informing jury of refusals and summarizing absent testimony violated Confrontation Clause and due process; prosecutor improperly capitalized on silence.	No reversible error: Lewis’s silence forfeited confrontation; Welch’s absence/synopsis was cumulative; prosecutor should have avoided placing refusals before jury but defendant not prejudiced.
Failure to give voluntary manslaughter instruction	Not applicable.	Requested instruction supported by minor provocation (a brief punch).	Denied: no reasonable jury could find adequate provocation/heat of passion given defendant waited armed and chased the fleeing victim.
Sufficiency of the evidence	Prosecution presented sufficient evidence that Wilkins shot Walker; witness credibility was for jury.	Key witnesses were incredible or fabricated; convictions unsupported.	Affirmed: viewing evidence in prosecution’s favor, a rational jury could convict; credibility determinations upheld.
Sentence reasonableness / upward departure	Sentence (45–100 yrs) disproportionate, especially given juvenile status at time of offense and MCL 769.25 implications.	Departure justified by factors not adequately reflected in guidelines: post‑offense criminality, witness‑intimidation pattern, lack of remorse, extensive adult record.	Affirmed: sentencing court gave individualized reasons (seriousness, obstruction of justice, criminal history); 45‑year minimum not disproportionate.
Ineffective assistance of counsel (failure to call witness, object)	Counsel omitted Marquis Thomas and failed to object to errors; prejudice occurred.	Trial strategy choices; no record support for Thomas testimony; preserved record does not show deficient performance or prejudice.	Denied: claims not supported on the record; strategic decisions presumed reasonable; no reasonable probability of different outcome shown.

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (individualized sentencing required for juvenile homicide offenders)
Milbourn v. People, 435 Mich. 630 (principle of proportionality in sentencing)
Lockridge v. Michigan, 498 Mich. 358 (advisory guidelines and reasonableness review)
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (forfeiture by wrongdoing extinguishes confrontation claims)
People v. VanderVliet, 444 Mich. 52 (three‑part test for other‑acts evidence under MRE 404(b))
People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750 (plain‑error standard)