People of Michigan v. Kyle Andrew Casillas
330424
| Mich. Ct. App. | Feb 28, 2017Background
- On Aug. 30, 2014, Casillas and roommates returned from a bar; after others left, Casillas placed his hand on a female guest’s knee and moved it up to touch the outside of her vagina. Casillas admitted the touching but denied sexual purpose.
- After the incident, Casillas damaged property, left, and was later arrested; his BAC was 0.238%.
- Charged with fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC IV), MCL 750.520e(1)(b); jury convicted him of CSC IV and awarded a three-month jail sentence.
- Pretrial, Casillas sought dismissal or alternative jury instructions challenging the constitutionality of the statute’s phrase “can reasonably be construed as” (arguing it diluted proof beyond a reasonable doubt); the trial court denied relief, treating CSC IV as a general-intent crime.
- Casillas sought to admit testimony from a toxicology expert about intoxication and behavior; the trial court excluded it under MRE 403 and because voluntary intoxication is not a defense to general-intent offenses.
- On appeal, the court affirmed: the “reasonably be construed” wording is constitutional for a general-intent sexual-contact statute, and exclusion of the toxicology expert was not an abuse of discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality of "can reasonably be construed as" in definition of "sexual contact" | Statute is constitutional; jury uses objective reasonable-person standard to assess sexual purpose | Phrase dilutes proof beyond a reasonable doubt by allowing inferred purpose rather than proving defendant's actual intent | Affirmed — statute constitutional; CSC IV is general-intent, and the phrase guides objective jury determination |
| Sufficiency of requiring specific intent for CSC IV | Prosecutor need only prove intentional touching that could reasonably be construed as sexual (general intent) | Jury must find defendant had actual sexual purpose (specific intent) | Affirmed — CSC IV is general-intent; specific intent is not an element |
| Exclusion of toxicology expert testimony | Expert not necessary because intoxication is not a defense to general-intent crimes; lay testimony could cover intoxication; expert would confuse issues and be prejudicial | Expert would explain behavior and context (high BAC), preventing jury speculation about actions | Affirmed — trial court did not abuse discretion under MRE 702/403; expert testimony irrelevant or more prejudicial/confusing |
| Jury instructions based on model statutory language | Model instructions properly reflect statutory elements and objective standard | Alternative instruction or omission of "reasonably be construed as" required | Affirmed — instructions were proper and not misleading |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Piper, 223 Mich. App. 642 (statute constitutional; reasonable-person standard guides jury on sexual purpose)
- People v. Russell, 266 Mich. App. 307 (CSC IV is a general-intent crime)
- People v. Hayes, 421 Mich. 271 (use of objective standards in sexual conduct analysis)
- People v. Fisher, 77 Mich. App. 6 (upholding related statutory language)
- People v. Brewer, 101 Mich. App. 194 (precedent upholding statute language)
- People v. Henry, 239 Mich. App. 140 (voluntary intoxication not a defense to general-intent crimes)
- People v. Ackerman, 257 Mich. App. 434 (standard of review for admission of expert testimony)
- People v. Douglas, 496 Mich. 557 (abuse-of-discretion standard explained)