People of Michigan v. Kenneth Dawayne Hill
329166
Mich. Ct. App.Feb 9, 2017Background
- Three defendants (Hill, Robinson, Diaz-Gaskin) participated in an armed robbery of a convenience store in which the storeowner was fatally shot; all three later confessed. Grayson (a codefendant) was tried separately.
- Surveillance showed three masked men enter, block the door, and two brandishing guns; Diaz-Gaskin jumped on the counter, tracked the victim with a handgun, and fired a single, fatal shot. The group then took cash and fled.
- Police obtained Miranda waivers and recorded custodial interrogations; each defendant ultimately admitted involvement (Hill as driver, Robinson as the unarmed robber who took cash, Diaz-Gaskin as the shooter who also wrote a remorse letter).
- At trial each defendant was convicted of felony murder (MCL 750.316(1)(b)), armed robbery (MCL 750.529), felony-firearm (MCL 750.227b), and conspiracy to commit armed robbery; they appealed raising multiple issues.
- The Court of Appeals reviewed suppression rulings de novo with factual findings for clear error, assessed claims of prosecutorial error and sufficiency of the evidence de novo, and reviewed severance and other procedural matters for abuse of discretion or plain error as applicable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Voluntariness of Hill’s confession (invocation of counsel; subsequent waiver) | Prosecution: Hill’s initial Miranda waiver was voluntary; his later decision to speak after briefly invoking counsel was knowing and voluntary under totality of circumstances. | Hill: detectives’ tactics coerced an involuntary confession; his request for a lawyer should have ended interrogation. | Court: Affirmed denial of suppression — Hill’s question about counsel was ambiguous, he knowingly reinitiated, and totality of circumstances supported voluntariness. |
| Discovery / alleged prosecutorial misconduct about detective’s perception of the interview | Prosecution: provided recorded and transcribed statements; no obligation to disclose Detective Quinn’s subjective perception, and any omission was non-exculpatory and cured by jury instructions. | Hill: prosecution failed to disclose that Detective Quinn heard something different on the video than the transcript, violating MCR 6.201 and due process. | Court: No discovery violation shown; testimony arose on cross-redirect, evidence was inculpatory, and jury instructions cured any potential prejudice. |
| Robinson’s invocation of counsel; severance; juror anonymity; sufficiency for aiding and abetting felony-firearm | Prosecution: Robinson’s question (“Do I need a lawyer?”) was equivocal; joint trial and juror-numbering were proper; evidence (entry with armed coactors, placing door block, taking cash) supported aiding and abetting felony-firearm. | Robinson: his question should have invoked counsel; joint trial caused spillover prejudice; anonymous voir dire prevented meaningful voir dire; insufficient evidence for felony-firearm aiding and abetting. | Court: Denied suppression — question was equivocal; severance not warranted absent mutually exclusive defenses or substantial antagonism; juror-numbering not reversible plain error; sufficient evidence supported aiding and abetting felony-firearm. |
| Diaz-Gaskin: ineffective assistance; sufficiency for malice (felony murder); omitted element in second-degree murder instruction | Prosecution: counsel’s decisions (not moving to sever, not suppressing, advising re: testifying) were reasonable; record contained admissions and video conduct supporting malice; omission of justification element harmless because no evidence of justification and instruction followed model guidance. | Diaz-Gaskin: trial counsel was ineffective (failure to sever, suppress, intimidation to prevent testifying); insufficient evidence of malice; jury should have been instructed on all elements of second-degree murder (including lack of justification). | Court: No relief — ineffective-assistance claims failed on record (no showing of prejudice or factual predicate); evidence (tracking and firing, continuing to aim) supported malice; omission of the justification element did not plainly prejudice defendant. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (establishing custodial interrogation warnings)
- People v. Tierney, 266 Mich. App. 687 (2005) (unequivocal invocation of right to counsel required to stop questioning)
- People v. Shipley, 256 Mich. App. 367 (2003) (voluntariness of confession assessed under totality of circumstances)
- People v. Bosca, 310 Mich. App. 1 (2015) (joint-trial/severance standard; spillover prejudice insufficient absent antagonistic defenses)
- People v. Moore, 470 Mich. 56 (2004) (elements and aiding-and-abetting standard for felony-firearm)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishing two-prong ineffective assistance standard)
- People v. Nowack, 462 Mich. 392 (2000) (circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences may satisfy criminal elements)