People of Michigan v. Kendrick Scott
502 Mich. 541
Mich.2018Background
- In 1999 Lisa Kindred was shot and killed while sitting in a van with her three children; two neighborhood witnesses (Antonio Burnette and Raymond Jackson) implicated Justly Johnson and Kendrick Scott. Both defendants were convicted (Johnson after a bench trial; Scott after a jury trial).
- Key prosecution evidence at trial was testimony from Burnette and Jackson; that testimony contained inconsistencies and both witnesses later reported threats and substance use around the events.
- Years after conviction, in 2011–2013, Charmous Skinner Jr. (then a child in the van) disclosed that he saw the shooter and that neither defendant matched the shooter’s physical description; he had not been interviewed previously.
- At an evidentiary hearing on motions for relief from judgment, Skinner testified consistent details and a psychologist testified that an 8-year-old could retain traumatic memories; Burnette recanted much of his prior trial testimony and Jackson’s cousin testified Jackson admitted lying at trial.
- The trial court denied relief, finding Skinner not credible (sleeping during the shooting, poor visibility, prior perjury conviction, and memory lapse). The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave and reversed in part, holding Skinner’s testimony (with other trial evidence and recantations) makes a different result probable and remanding for new trials.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the newly discovered eyewitness (Skinner) claim was procedurally barred under MCR 6.508(D)(3) and MCR 6.502(G) | State: defendants should be barred if claims could have been raised earlier | Defs: Skinner’s account was unknown until 2011, so claim is timely and permitted | Not barred: Skinner’s claim could not have been raised earlier and successive-motion rules allow newly discovered evidence |
| Standard for granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence | State: newly discovered evidence must be credible and make a different result probable | Defs: Skinner satisfies the Cress factors and his testimony is credible | Applied Cress: defendant must show (1) newly discovered; (2) not cumulative; (3) due diligence; (4) makes different result probable; first three were conceded; central dispute was prong four |
| Whether the trial court properly assessed Skinner’s credibility when deciding prong four | State: trial court reasonably found Skinner incredible (asleep, obstructed view, prior perjury, faded memory) | Defs: trial court erred—relied on speculation, ignored expert, and focused on judge’s personal memory; reasonable juror could credit Skinner | Court: trial court clearly erred on key factual bases (sleep finding, judge’s memory comparison, failure to consider expert and lighting/angle factors); Skinner was not patently incredible, so credibility must be viewed as a juror might view it |
| Whether Skinner’s testimony, when considered with existing trial evidence and recantations, makes a different result probable on retrial | State: even if Skinner credible, prior trial testimony, jury verdict, and credibility findings support conviction; recantations are suspect | Defs: Skinner’s ID (descriptive differences), weaknesses/inconsistencies in Burnette/Jackson, and recantations undermine original evidence | Held: Considering Skinner plus weaknesses in Burnette/Jackson (and Burnette’s recantation), a different result is reasonably probable; new trials ordered |
Key Cases Cited
- People v Cress, 468 Mich. 678 (2003) (four-prong test for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence)
- People v Anderson, 501 Mich. 175 (2018) (comparison of fact-finder roles in credibility determinations)
- People v Ginther, 390 Mich. 436 (1974) (Ginther evidentiary hearing standard for postconviction claims)
- People v Grissom, 492 Mich. 296 (2012) (consider newly discovered evidence in light of trial evidence)
- People v Barbara, 400 Mich. 352 (1977) (recantations are viewed with suspicion)
- Van Den Dreissche v. People, 233 Mich. 38 (1925) (recanting testimony is exceedingly unreliable)
- Connelly v. United States, 271 F.2d 333 (8th Cir. 1959) (trial court gatekeeping on credibility of newly offered testimony for new trial requests)
- People v Lemmon, 456 Mich. 625 (1998) (jury as ultimate judge of credibility)