People of Michigan v. Joshua Quincy Burns
327179
Mich. Ct. App.Nov 1, 2016Background
- Infant (11 weeks) hospitalized with subacute cerebellar blood and multilayered bilateral retinal hemorrhages; injuries dated to Mar 11–16, 2014.
- Defendant (father) was alone with the infant for ~1 hour 20 minutes on Mar 15–16; mother was alone with child at other times in the relevant window.
- Defendant admitted grabbing the child’s face to prevent a fall; denied knowledge of head striking table/floor.
- Prosecution’s expert testified the injury pattern was highly specific for repetitive acceleration–deceleration (abusive head trauma) and that the combination of findings was "close to 100 percent" diagnostic of abuse.
- Defense retained two experts who challenged aspects of the prosecution expert’s causal mechanism but largely agreed that the injury pattern was consistent with abusive head trauma.
- Defendant convicted by jury of second-degree child abuse (reckless act causing serious physical harm); sentenced to 3 years probation with first year in jail. Appeal raised ineffective-assistance, Daubert exclusion, evidentiary rulings, sufficiency of evidence, and jury-instructions issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ineffective assistance for failing to seek Daubert exclusion of prosecution expert testimony | Prosecution: trial counsel reasonably pursued strategy by presenting contradictory experts and cross-examination instead of a Daubert challenge | Burns: counsel should have moved to exclude expert statements that retinal hemorrhages and the triad are highly specific/"close to 100%" for abuse as unsupported junk science | Court: No deficiency — counsel’s strategy reasonable, defense experts undermined claim of junk science; no prejudice shown |
| Failure to admit e-mail exchange for impeachment | Prosecution: e-mails were properly excluded as hearsay/substantive; admission likely to be construed as substantive and confusing | Burns: e-mail showed prosecution expert was closed-minded and would impeach her credibility | Court: No ineffective assistance — e-mails properly excluded; no reasonable probability of different outcome |
| Sufficiency of evidence / identity element | Prosecution: circumstantial evidence (timing of injuries, who was alone with infant, experts’ injury dating) sufficient to show defendant committed reckless act causing serious harm | Burns: no direct evidence linking him to the injuring act; other possible actors (mother) existed during window | Court: Evidence viewed in favor of prosecution supports reasonable inference defendant committed the reckless act; directed-verdict denial affirmed |
| Jury instruction on "reckless act" definition | Prosecution: statutory and pattern instruction adequate; ordinary meaning conveys recklessness | Burns: court should have defined "reckless" as conscious disregard of known risk (borrow definition from vulnerable-adult statute) | Court: No error — common meaning suffices; prior case law rejects need for additional statutory definition |
Key Cases Cited
- Cress v. People, 468 Mich. 678 (trial court review of new-trial motions)
- Unger v. People, 278 Mich. App. 210 (trial court discretion re: evidentiary hearings/admissibility)
- Heft v. People, 299 Mich. App. 69 (effective-assistance standards)
- Vaughn v. People, 491 Mich. 642 (presumption of adequate representation)
- Pickens v. People, 446 Mich. 298 (deference to trial strategy)
- Kowalski v. People, 492 Mich. 106 (MRE 702 reliability factors / Daubert framework)
- Ackley v. People, 497 Mich. 381 (defense counsel ineffective for failing to engage expert re: abusive head trauma controversy)
- Gregg v. People, 206 Mich. App. 208 (no need to define "reckless" beyond ordinary meaning)
- Aldrich v. People, 246 Mich. App. 101 (standard for reviewing directed-verdict denial)
- Ginther v. People, 390 Mich. 436 (need for evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance claims)
