People of Michigan v. Glorianna Woodard
321 Mich. App. 377
| Mich. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- On March 6, 2015, MSP Trooper Ramirez stopped Glorianna Woodard, observed signs of intoxication, arrested her, and obtained her voluntary consent to a blood draw at a hospital.
- Blood was drawn and sent to the Michigan State Police lab for analysis.
- On March 9 (before lab testing), Woodard’s counsel sent written notice withdrawing consent and demanding return of the blood and that further testing cease absent a warrant.
- Authorities proceeded to test the sample; results showed a BAC of 0.212. Woodard moved to suppress the test results as the product of an unlawful search.
- The trial court denied suppression, relying on People v Perlos and precedent treating lawful collection and later testing as not creating a new Fourth Amendment search. Woodard appealed interlocutorily.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed: because the blood draw was consensual and complete before withdrawal, and society does not recognize a reasonable privacy interest in BAC of a voluntarily provided sample, subsequent analysis did not constitute a separate Fourth Amendment search.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether analysis of a lawfully obtained, voluntarily provided blood sample is a separate Fourth Amendment search permitting withdrawal of consent before testing | Prosecution: once blood is lawfully seized for alcohol testing, testing it later is part of the seizure and not a new search; no reasonable privacy interest in BAC of voluntarily given sample | Woodard: consent can be revoked at any time before analysis; testing after written withdrawal without a warrant is an unreasonable, warrantless search | Held: Analysis of lawfully obtained consensual blood is not a separate search; withdrawal after collection comes too late and suppression is not warranted |
| Whether withdrawal of consent after the blood draw entitles defendant to return of the sample or precludes testing | State: evidence lawfully seized during a consent search remains police property; revocation does not retroactively undo the seizure | Woodard: she demanded return and cessation of testing; without a warrant, analysis is unreasonable | Held: revocation does not require return nor prevent analysis of lawfully obtained evidence for the purpose collected |
| Whether Skinner or McNeely support treating collection and testing as separate searches | State: those cases do not mandate treating testing of an already-lawful sample as a distinct search; Perlos and implied-consent context support limited privacy expectations | Woodard: cites Skinner and McNeely to show significant privacy interest in biological samples and that nonconsensual draws implicate privacy | Held: McNeely and Skinner do not change outcome where sample was voluntarily and lawfully collected; diminished expectation applies to BAC testing context |
| Whether exclusionary rule should apply to lab analysis done after withdrawal but before warrant | State: not applicable because no Fourth Amendment violation occurred; alternatively probable cause/warrant would have supported testing | Woodard: testing without warrant after withdrawal requires suppression | Held: No Fourth Amendment violation, so exclusionary rule not triggered; court did not reach alternative probable-cause/warrant argument |
Key Cases Cited
- Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016) (drawing blood is a Fourth Amendment search due to physical intrusion)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (compelled blood draws implicate significant privacy interests; exigency not per se)
- Skinner v. R. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (collection and analysis of biological samples are Fourth Amendment searches examined under totality of circumstances)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood extraction and testing considered in context of Fourth Amendment; testing tied to seizure)
- Jacobsen, United States v., 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (seizure defined as meaningful interference with possessory interest; analysis of seized items may be evaluated under privacy-expectation test)
- Perlos v. Michigan, 436 Mich. 305 (1989) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in hospital blood alcohol test results in drunk-driving context; implied-consent considerations)
- United States v. Snyder, 852 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1988) (collection and testing of blood treated as single event for Fourth Amendment purposes)
- Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 2010) (testing of lawfully obtained blood has no independent Fourth Amendment significance)
- Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (warrant requirement for searching digital contents of a cell phone seized incident to arrest; discussed but distinguished as not controlling here)