People of Michigan v. Gary Patrick Lewis
154396
| Mich. | Jul 31, 2017Background
- Gary Lewis was bound over after a preliminary examination at which he appeared without counsel (his appointed attorney was present but the court treated Lewis as electing to proceed pro se, then removed him for disruption); the prosecutor continued and Lewis was bound over.
- Lewis was tried with counsel, convicted of arson charges, and sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to lengthy prison terms.
- On appeal the Court of Appeals concluded Lewis was deprived of counsel at the preliminary examination and, relying on United States v. Cronic, granted automatic reversal and a new trial.
- The State appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which accepted review to resolve whether denial of counsel at a preliminary examination is a structural error requiring automatic reversal or is subject to harmless-error review.
- The Michigan Supreme Court unanimously held Coleman v. Alabama controls: denial of counsel at a preliminary examination is subject to harmless-error analysis; it reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings to determine harmlessness and other issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of counsel at a preliminary examination is structural error requiring automatic reversal | People: Coleman controls; error is subject to harmless-error review (i.e., no automatic reversal) | Lewis: Cronic dictates that complete denial of counsel at a critical stage is structural and requires automatic reversal | Held: Coleman is controlling; the error is subject to harmless-error review, not automatic reversal |
| Whether Cronic implicitly overruled Coleman | People: Cronic’s relevant statements are dictum and cannot overrule Coleman’s holding | Lewis: Cronic’s broader language supports presuming prejudice from denial of counsel | Held: Cronic’s relevant language is dictum here; Coleman remains binding precedent |
| Standard and framework for assessing harmlessness of counsel denial at preliminary exam | People: Chapman harmless-error framework applies on remand | Lewis: Harmlessness is effectively speculative and difficult to apply | Held: Harmless-error review required, but Michigan Supreme Court remanded to Court of Appeals to develop substantive criteria and procedures for that analysis |
| Whether subsequent fair trial and absence of preliminary-exam evidence automatically render error harmless | People: argued trial fairness and non-use of preliminary-exam evidence suggest harmlessness | Lewis: Coleman forbids presuming harmlessness solely from later conviction or nonuse of hearing evidence | Held: Court rejected presumptions either way — cannot presume prejudice merely from denial nor presume harmless because of later conviction; remanded for proper harmlessness inquiry |
Key Cases Cited
- Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (holding denial of counsel at preliminary hearing is subject to harmless-error review and remanding for Chapman analysis)
- United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (discussing circumstances warranting presumed prejudice, including dictum about complete denial of counsel at a critical stage)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (establishing harmless-error standard for constitutional errors)
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel at trial; structural-error discussion cited by analogy)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel; context for Cronic)
- United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986) (post-verdict evaluation of certain grand-jury errors irrelevant to trial fairness)
- Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (holding that courts must follow Supreme Court holdings over dicta)
- Gonzalez-Lopez v. Colorado, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (recognizing certain structural errors that mandate reversal and cautioning against speculative harmless-error inquiries)